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Firs cial District Court - Kootenai Count{~7 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2OO6-OOO715O Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, etal. 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, Donald W Friis 
Date Code User 
9/26/2006 OLSON Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Amaro Law Office 
Receipt number: 0714973 Dated: 9/26/2006 
Amount: $88.00 (Check) 
SUMI BARTON Summons Issued 
10/17/2006 MCCOY Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Peter 
Erbland Receipt number: 0717836 Dated: 
10/17/2006 Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
AFSV REMPFER Affidavit Of Service Michael Burke 2 Oct 06 
I\JOAP MCCOY Notice Of Appearance - Peter Erbland OBO 
Donald Friis 
10/20/2006 ZLATICH Filing: 11A- Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Naylor & 
Hales Receipt number: 0718372 Dated: 
10/20/2006 Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
I\JOAP ZLATICH Notice Of Appearance Bruce Castleton OBO Def 
North Idaho College 
10/25/2006 AFSV SRIGGS Affidavit Of Service/Donald Friis 10/14/06 
11/2/2006 HRSC TAYLOR Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
01/08/2007 03:30 PM) 
TAYLOR Notice of Hearing 
11/3/2006 NOTC LEITZKE Notice of Removal and Demand for Jury Trial 
(Removed to Federal Court) 
CVDI LEITZKE Civil Disposition entered for: Friis, Donald W, 
Defendant; North Idaho College, Defendant; 
Johnson, Victoria, Plaintiff. 
order date: 11/3/2006 
FJDE LEITZKE Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered 
HRVC TAYLOR Hearing result for Status Conference held on 
01/08/2007 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
STAT TAYLOR Case status changed: closed 
11/9/2006 RSCN PARKER Response to Status Conference Notice 
11/13/2006 MISC SRIGGS Consent to Removal 
2/12/2010 ORDR HUFFMAN Order Adopting Report & Recommendation 
7/22/2010 MOTN HUFFMAI\J Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
MISC HUFFMAN Defendant North Idaho College's Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts 
MEMO HUFFMAN Memorandum in Support of Defendant North 
Idaho College's Motion for Summary Judgment 
FILE BIELEC *******File 2 Created******** 
AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Bruce J Castleton in Support of 
Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
User: LEU 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Date: 3/30/2011 
Time: 01:01 PM 
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Firs 2'tkial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0007150 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, etal. 
User: LEU 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, Donald W Friis 
Date 
7/27/2010 
8/25/2010 
9/1/2010 
9/8/2010 
9/10/2010 
9/20/2010 
9/27/2010 
10/15/2010 
10/27/2010 
11/1/2010 
11/4/2010 
11/9/2010 
Code 
HRSC 
STAT 
NOHG 
AFFD 
MEMO 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
DCHH 
HRSC 
ANSW 
RSCN 
MEMO 
MOTN 
HRSC 
DCHH 
HRSC 
ANHR 
User 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 09/08/2010 03:30 PM) Castleton 
SVERDSTEN Case status changed: Reopened 
SREED Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant North Idaho 
College's Motion for Summary Judgment 
CLEVELAND Affidavit of James McMillan in Opposition to 
Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
CLEVELAND Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
CLEVELAND Affidavit of James McMillan in Opposition to Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
CLEVELAND Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant North Idaho Lansing L. Haynes 
College's Motion for Summary Judgment 
ROSEf\lBUSCH Defendant North Idaho College's Memorandum in Lansing L. Haynes 
Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
held on 09/08/2010 03:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Castleton 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L. Haynes 
11/01/2010 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
CLEVELAND Answer - Response to Status Conference Notice Lansing L. Haynes 
SREED Response to Status Conference Notice-Castleton Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Defendant Lansing L. Haynes 
North Idaho College's Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
BAXLEY Defendant North Idaho College's Motion For Lansing L. Haynes 
Reconsideration 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 
12/17/2010 09:00 AM) Bruce Castleton 
Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Status Conference held on Lansing L. Haynes 
11/01/2010 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
06/20/2011 09:00 AM) 4 DAYS 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Trial 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
ROSEN BUSCH Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Defendant North Lansing L. Haynes 
Idaho College's Motion for Reconsideration 
Date: 3/30/2011 
Time: 01:01 PM 
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Firs ·cial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0007150 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, etal. 
User: LEU 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, Donald W Friis 
Date 
12/8/2010 
12/10/2010 
12/15/2010 
12/17/2010 
12/22/2010 
1/3/2011 
1/11/2011 
1/12/2011 
1/21/2011 
3/4/2011 
Code 
ANHR 
OBJT 
MISC 
DCHH 
PLWL 
HRSC 
LETR 
DCHH 
HRVC 
FILE 
ORDR 
CVDI 
FJDE 
STAT 
NOTC 
User 
BAXLEY SECOND Amended Notice Of Hearing RE 
Defendant North Idaho College's Motion For 
Reconsideration on 12/17/10 at 9:00 am 
Judge 
Lansing L. Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Objection to Defendant North Idaho Lansing L. Haynes 
College's Motion for Reconsideration 
CRUMPACKER Defendant North Idaho College's Reply to Lansing L. Haynes 
Plaintiff's Objection to Defendant N IC's Motion for 
Reconsideration 
SVERDSTEI\J Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on Lansing L. Haynes 
12/17/2010 09:00 AM: TAKEN Uf\lDER 
ADVISEMENT District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: LAURIE JOHNSON 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Bruce Castleton - APPEARING 
TELEPHONICALLY 208-947-2069 DIRECT 
LINE (office 208-343-9511) 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiff's Expert Witness Disclosure Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Decision 01/11/2011 01 :30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Attorneys will be appearing telephonically. 
Mr. Castleton will set up the conference call. 
208-94 7-2069 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
LEU Letter From Bruce J. Castleton 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Decision held on 01/11/2011 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Court Reporter: VAL NUNEMACHER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Attorneys will be appearing 
telephonically. Mr. Castleton has set up the 
conference call. dial 888-204-5987 and enter 
code 1970256 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on Lansing L. Haynes 
06/20/2011 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 4 
POOLE 
LEU 
LEU 
LEU 
DAYS 
New File Created# 3 Expando-Judges Notes 
Order 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Civil Disposition entered for: Friis, Donald W, Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendant; North Idaho College, Defendant; 
Johnson, Victoria, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/21/2011 
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered Lansing L. Haynes 
LEU Case status changed: Closed Lansing L. Haynes 
CLEVELAND Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
to Supreme Court Paid by: McMillan, James 
(attorney for Johnson, Victoria) Receipt number: 
0009248 Dated: 3/4/2011 Amount: $101.00 
(Check) For: Johnson, Victoria (plaintiff) 
BIELEC Notice Of Appeal Lansing L. Haynes 
Date: 3/30/2011 
Time: 01 :01 PM 
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Firs "cial District Court - Kootenai Count 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0007150 Current Judge: Lansing L. Haynes 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, etal. 
User: LEU 
Victoria Johnson vs. North Idaho College, Donald W Friis 
Date Code User Judge 
3/4/2011 APDC BIELEC Appeal Filed In District Court Lansing L. Haynes 
STAT BIELEC Case status changed: Reopened Lansing L. Haynes 
3/7/2011 BNDC LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9454 Dated Lansing L. Haynes 
3/7/2011 for 100.00) 
3/8/2011 BNDC LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 9938 Dated Lansing L. Haynes 
3/8/2011 for 200.00) 
3/17/2011 NAPL SREED Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court Lansing L. Haynes 
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08/2-1/2010 14: 28 FAX 208 752 
JAMES Mc.MJLLAN, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 752-1900 
!SB# 7523 
Attorney for Plaintiff. 
Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law 141001 
(;I . . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
Corporation, and DONAL:0 FRIIS, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Shoshone ) 
Case No. CV-06-7150 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMil..LAN IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT NORTH 
IDAHO COLLEGE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
I, JAMES McMILLAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen and am co1J1petent to testify to the matters set forth 
herein; 
2. I am the attorney of record for the Plaintiff in this matter and have personal 
.-'\FFIDAVI'f OF JAMES McMILLAN 1 
l):\.Cli1nu\h.11lull)c,, V~10th1\Am1M,1IL of Jo11101 McMlll.a11 (2010 OB i,--J~J,00~ 
SC 38605-2011 223 of 323 
25 / 2010 14 : 29 FAX 208 752 19 Jas . *cMillan AttY ~ Law ~002 
lmowledge of the facts to which I am testifying. · 
3. Attached bereto as Exhibit A is a tme and correct copy of Plaintiffs State of 
Material Facts Which Aie In Dispute, filed in United Stares District Court Case No. CIV-06-436-
EJL as Docket No. 64;. 
4. Attached hereto as Exbjbit B is a true and correct copy of th.e Affidavit of 
Michelle Cook In Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, filed in United 
States District Court Case No. CIV-06-436-EJL as Docket No. 67; 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Victoria 
Johnson In Opposition to Defend.ants' Motions for Summary Judgment, filed in United States 
District Court Case No. CIV-06-436-EJL as Docket No. 66; and 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D js a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Ra.mi 
Amaro In Opposition to Defendants' Moti.ons for Summary Judgment, filed in United States District 
Court Case No. CN-06-436-EJL as Docket No. 65 . 
Further your affiant sayetb naught. 
SUBSCRIBED and swam to before me on tbeJ-~,.-day of August, 201.0. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAM.BS McMILLAN 2" 
('l.-4,(">-c,,.,\~'-""' V'~.;, ,,f._ 1, l////""'1r,.il )\1111()0l~GI ll-.lMl).b 
SC 38605-2011 
hlo, .. cnvYv~~) 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of Idaho 
Residing in Silverton 
My Commission Expires 12/31/2013 
224 of 323 
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1 2512010 14: 29 FAX 208 7 5 2 1 & Jas. McMillan Atty @ Law ~003 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY th~t on the,f\'7tay of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to the following, by the method indicated below: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor/Bruce J. Castleton 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Attorneys for De:f endant NIC 
Peter C. ETbland 
Paine Hamblen, L.L.P. 
701 Front Ave. 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, lD 83816 
Attorney for Defendant Friis 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES McMILLAN 3 
O!\Cli~U'\Sol:1.n.1011, Vle1D1h\An'lt10-wii c.r J:.iui:t Me:Mlllut1 flOlO O! 13-JMc),dot 
SC 38605-2011 
:I 
US.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered X Facsimile to: (208) 383-9516 
US. Mail . 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
XFacsimile to: (208) 664-6338 
225 of 323 
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l'lain1IJ\'. 
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(.'1•rpun11i ... 11. a,111 l){)l-,;Al.D FRJIS. ~n inili\·lduul 
!kli:n1fanL~. 
__  , _ J 
( ~$~ >Jo. CfV06-4J6-(JI. 
PLAlt>'Tll7f''!- STATF:Mf:NT Of' 
MATF.RIA.I. F'ACT'S WH IC.H ARF'. IN 
OISPOTF. IN OPPOS(TION TO 
DEfENUA.~lS' .-.-iO'l'IONS FOR 
Sl:M~AltY ./Ul)GME'.I\T -
C'OMt::S 1--·ow th.: Plai11t.iff. VICTOR I,\ JOl-tNSON. by lll\d throui;,h her C,1u11~.:I vi' Rc~on.l 
began i11 1001. when M~. Jnhri.:;011 enrolled in 1111 \01rolluc10ry cucnpvt..:r .;\~s.s ~l l'\I(.; t.1111i;_n1 lly f'ri i,. al 
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Case 2:06-cv-00436-EJL-CWD Document 64 Flied 11/2611.1, Page 2 of 5 
Tllrou~houl. triis. inoi.:a1cd 1hut h~r l\,11ilc: could Ile o.ffcclcd hy h.;r 1t:Spllnst ll> h~-: ::icl.ioM 
h,h~,,i111' i;,111li11uc(I. umll -.he wOS lo~ct.l Ill v.·iUlllll•\\' fl\llll the COUr'Sl' IWIO( II> lhC com:h1Shln af lhc 
scmcslt:r. 
l. Ms. Joh11~on i:11n1in11e<l :\t '-IIC. a,,d wa~ ~g&in informed. In 2004, 1hc1t sh.: .~huu!d 111ki: 
u.\1111.1 hll\'~ irnprci,, d . 
.). 11c,u.·c:,·c1. l).:1'cotlMI rri1i1 · 1,c:h;,viur did no/ hnpro,-c. nnd. io fat·I. bc:~n le• csCzU(\I.:'. Ill 
11\c~-a'!:•'~ i~ in 1hi: po..,,i:s.\ion of all parrks. 3Dd 111ill be 11-~,-d D.$ evidence at tri<1I. iJJl!I i., suhmin~ in 
\ ' 
prari ...s 1111 r:.~hit,i1 tu 1hc .'\lfo:h1v_i1 of Vic1ori11 Johnson. filed con1cmpor1meou~ly hcrcwi1h, 
,: 
:\ . 1)11..: 1,\ r- riif h~J~5mc111. M:1. Johnicin "''ti:I :\fraid r.o appro11.i:h hi1Yl rcaordin~ her ~nur~c-
r,·s,,llillll i11 hc-.r t\iilur~ uf the Cllur~t. 
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Case 2:06-c'll•0043S-E.JL-CWD Document 64 Filed 11126/u, Page 3 ol S 
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I. );h111,lui •) : Ill 1>:,.-1: v<.>Ull t~c11i11~ Vicuwi~ 1hi~ i~ Uo11 i:,;;~. I' ,n Wt1lki11~ :11,,und 
n11 111y l'rilf1,rt~· 1iu1 sur( ii .~0,1 con kc:ir ,nc nr ,101. I' ,·c l1ce11 1hi11ki11i; atit11,1 yuu 
~11 \\'~t:i<. I' ,11 hopin11, 1hi1l y1.W dO)' IVfllS 0111 II~ whn1 :-,1111 w~111 ~11tJ 1lm1 y1111r uc,1 uh 
~"d ~nd 11\:i1's rc:ill~ imtior1w1t. I k,wu· hv\\' )'(111 li:~l 011d 11ll I wi~II lht<, " ''~ 
1~>mcthi,1~ I .:.io 110 ;,l;,<.,ul ii. 1 ju~I Wll\lll:'d 1n tell ynu 1k:11 \"II ~lnnd u(l 1·11, .•uu. C\l 
h~c,11h\11kin~ ohcw1 )'"" ~ 1 .. 1 lhifi --·~de \ .lh I ho~· tu II.cur 1"111<11 y,,11 1his nc:,,;1 
,w,;L. I wnulJ like- In uh 11ct tn~tll-ltr uh 111u:-'o,.; 1h~rc·~" pu~ibilil~· 1hcn.;. 
:\l\)'W~Y- I _j11~1 wont~c\ ll) let you kil<"Y lhRI uh 11\lll my lhOll!:,hb m11l pmy..:rs nn: 
"i1h yuu tinJ uh I hupi: 11> hcur l'n>>" you a11d I ho('I.: th:ll y11u 1'0,·.: i;notl 11,'\\S 
ahu111 )'uur ,iLlb unJ !lull yuu·r.: c11tnfor1ublc 1.>.'11\1 it :incl ii.~ uh ~C1in.:1hi1,L: ~:,1u \l'Jl'I 
11.> d11. ,\~;;in thii.: is Uun l·'t'ii~. I h"rc tn hc:>r l'ru,11 ruu and uh. pk3sc hnv~ 11 ~w,d 
wcd;cnd . 
. \.lu11tJay li :50 l'lvl: Hey Viclori~. 1-t.iv.-a,c: ~01111itl:iy'! Thix i~ l)un flrils . .. 
u,1i,11ulli.~ihh: . . I k,,p,: yc,u ·r..: doi11~ --·di. l"n, Su~ lo,1ki11l! fon.·Jrd 10 ~cc.-i11~ yu,1 
:,nd i;,O.:ini,: with ~011 in ncrson ~unin. I II\ I Ju.-i \\11111 10 1ou~h b.is.: wi,h ~-ou. I 
ho11r all is l'lllc:- ant.I !hul yu,1'1c rdoxi11~ ~n(\ uh ~inrn,.- ;\ .:all if )'(11 1 llccil 11oy1llini,: 
" ' ir ~-,w 11.:..:d hd1111h ~in1mc ,, .:1111 . tuw ,., SI°<!) ou nnd vh ln,1ki11~ l~1r-1 ;ird 10 
h1" ·111~ ;1 rcl111iul'~h1r, "i1h i·u11. Y1J,1 r:,1.1.' ~nrc ,lr' y,,ur~t:IL 01.;u~ . Tl\i., is l)rn1 
1:.-;;). 
,\ . WeJ110,l,1~ 10:51> ,\:vi: I lcllo llicwria thix i:1 u,m. l h\'lpc ~ou ~.:11ni1 111css1111-c 
)'.:Sl..:(IIJ}" I bo'l'll~hl 1°,\r,ickcl~ for K ,11~ lt':1 lhi~ rridoy . I ,,ould 111,•c lU l~ke tl'.'U 
u, 1lw plu~· K:,t:> 1hi~ f.ridi'!' 11n<I pls(I 1:1k,• y,,u tO tllnn<'.r, I his i~ Wcd11e.tc.l.ir now 
i-> rkosc pko:«.: c11ll 111.:: 10 i:u11lirin H y~•u wuuld like to i;o 10 dm1icr :,ncl if .vo11 
,,·uulJ liki:- K~1~. I hope )'nu .. -oulcl vh ,;1111si,k1 i1. I thin!,; it " ·ould ~c l!rciit I lhinl 
wi, l11.)lh need ii :u,d I think ii lV<llllO k ru11. So anyw3y uh I hfli,<.' (hlll you 
~u,,~i..lcr it i\nrl 111• I h('l~ 11, hcor fr11111 yu11, Th111 · 11 ~ . uh kls ~cc. >'ri,by .'\uitus1 
2rJ'\ . I\ :ilu' h ,11 ?:.\0. t·d ~all~ ~ppr~ci~1c ir it'~ou could ie1 hutk ,~i1h oK \ ~ot 
1 wo, id:c 1, un T 11t·~1fay l! ~d I'd lo,·, 10 rnkc )'OU. ~lsn III din11c:1. Uh cl".:- 1111.' u i.::i II. 
Y,w haw o 1,;rc:it c1·c11ing, 
-1 . WeJntscl:,y "1 :45 P:'vl · I le;' Vic1orin thi~ is L)l)11, I ' m lryin~ lu rnll yllll rn11hc 
M l<.14?fi ,u,tl I k1.•cp 1,:~lttnl!," s11,w,<.J 11-1111 ~u~-s lt'i: hu.,~·. A11yw11y, I j1111 wnn1..:,I hJ 
1<'1 y,111 t1\n\\· I hav~ 1wo 1ii.:!-c:1~ for ibis f.rid~r t'o1 Kots. I w1•11l1I 1,,,·c h> be ,,·i1h 
_vN, _.,,11 \i•k.: ~,,u 111 it al'ld ol~o t~kc ~'\\\I ICI tlin11cr. Su w"u!tl ~'11\J r,lc11~c b'.ivc m.: 
,;;,I I ~nu,~, u,, know 1h:.\I you n:cciv.:d lhis m.:~sui::c uncl l\ll\l rnu ca11 i;,i. 1 IR•flC 
y,>u c:Jn. 1 ·11 h, lrn,ki~~ forw~rd 10 h~nring from )'l•U. I !!ucs~ 1na1 · ~ i1. 1-i:l\'c :, 
!L"ud rl,•! I)~-:, 
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Summary of FincJiilg§ 
Doil a\lemr,ten a dating/ personal ral:311onshiri with ~ s1urlen1 
while he stltt had comrol over her grade. The final 
de1a1mina1:on of tne graoe·woulrl not be mac.1~ uritil 1oe end of 
\he s(J,..11, week chJring the !ell semester af 2004. 
0011 plearJi,cJ lgnoral)ce will'\ 1especl 10 thinking nis ar:1\ons we;e. 
lneppropr1a,e. 
o "I didn't put !n my mind tbal she was c1 sludonl' 
c, "II we~ poor jurlgme,111 on my part" 
~ Oon's Gyllobus. In two separate are2s, ~ddrecses NIC policy 
and Federal Lew in regards 10 soxual harassm~oi. 
Don co1.1n.~0lerJ Sharon Olson (sluden\ teach.?< 11'1 Ed. 20 \ Fl.:M 
fxperlcnc,;) aS lo the lmpo11ance ot koeplng a pmiosslon~I 
relationship t01A'clrd slurJ1m1:;. Stiaron lolcf thiG lo our group. 
In Don·., r%r,oose tc, thG GorN>lo\nl, h~ stalec, "I hEve ,,ever 
b130n repo1(1:Hl /or er,y Ir.rm or hnr~ssmanl :ci.ny11rns during (":"I'.',' 
len11rc, ;is an ins<rur.tor'. 
,, However, JI v,as discovered lhal an in<o1mal compl;;iint 
~arJ been made t() HR on Jan. 2 I, 200-4, wh~n a ·1ouny 
,i,en made a complc1:nl regarding now clnse Don go\ lo 
him. The youno rnan expressed ccincem anrl discomfort 
ahl,ul Mow close Oo,, "gels to him in crass". 
o 0or1 w;a:; reqllirod lo go t,, counseling/ 3ensttlvity u alnl119 
,:in ·::ioundEsries ol loucl":" will\ ar. area .:ounse101. 
0 l)on ·.vas reaulred to go to r.ounseling/ seMllivity trQining 
on "bouodari£S of louc;h" with an aree counselor. 
c Oon ullenoP,d the reQuirod NIC: sexu;;I harassment 
workshop on t-6-O4 and lhe manr:lalerl ~ansilivity uai,;ir,g 
in February, 2004_ Oesplle tM trc1ining, the lr.c.iden1t ·""11:, 
\Jlc:tr,,ia continu.:d lo oc,JJr wltl-.in the sc1~a sar.'lester of 
ihe lrt1lnings. 
:-, ,hfhUe Don shower! thg abili\y :o undt>rst~nd and 
comrnunic;,le !he concopts wi'.h Iha l:d. 21) 1 student, hi~ 
t,e11avior wl:h Victoria wes lnr.onslslenl wlth his 
knowledge base. 
AR ror,g ~ 111a gr1<0~ 1·1s in play~, Don was In o pr,l'ittlotl r,I pc,·.vi:,r 
with the sltJdP.nl. ln 1he :ap~ I)( 1he telephone c::ills to \ilctor l3. 
Don mi>:9d r:lassronm ·cornpu1e1 wo1k" (c&II -Jf, on S,mrJay. e.311 
p.m.) and the c.leslrt: lo oete: /-c!VP. a celalior,ship wilh I.er. 
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cc ; 
RP..: 
Ju<.ly }> .. '<er, '&t~.rt $, Pro[cuio11cl ?,0,,11"' Chi ii 
l:.•\'t,:ciJO" 111 rJ.~~ 
Do" r-,;;1 
--------------
>.11c1)lODf,idO Judy p,.,~cr•, 1,:q1>•" 1hi.s tf\truooo. <tli1 mcf1l!I is 10 tt!Alc <ht ob~cf'/co ~dio<U o(Doo 
Friis OIi April 16. 200:i. 
()11 Ar•ril 26 (let: 11\Ml;os), Oayr,t Clit/oul incl I n.rt cunvcrri,\P. ouuidt 0111· on',u~ .,.(I "'"t 
!h1••I)' ,ea\'tiog by t)on'J ol'ficc oo ou, "''Y to ,ta.,,. Hi1 door -vu f'l~n Mncl I coulJ 3CG lh•I • fc;molc 
\lvdCOl ,.-a1 ~il\i"i ~• D.:>n' I ur:ic~ e1'•ic bl r,onl 1>f Iii~ co•l'C)~•cr. l)oo .._~, si1,int close 1<> her lefl ii' 
.mo1hc1 co,it. ·nu studull h(l(I ~ folder or book (l dl<ln'1 p~)' ,·e1; clo~ .-icn1i01110 t~il) o~ )ltr ~p. 
Con \I'~' 1,!~ini lb hct - ir.J l SJ'"' i>\111 1u~b hct 1ll0uld« u1d 1ho.1> in a!'lo~r scalcf'I~• or ,;,.io. be-
1c-1d1tcl I>"..,. t11cl laid~ hand on 1n11 uf tho bo~l.lfolder. I tollld oot clearly ~o, t),ci> COl\''G'"'•l•OD -
a.111I I 1JJ1•1D•d t,oo ,..'1 probably 1u1()(ini or coun.,:lins her. 
C~yne ~nd I proe<1t.dod uo.,,\ tbA hl)I 1.11d "'hte ~·• ,ucll1d the !OP o/ 1,be 11.iJs I •I09j>ecl Oayo< a"d 
rcrMrlr.cd "ubyne. did you ~c, Don ,ouch lli64 ,Ndtnl? 'O>Yt ..-,s I uupid 1hi119 10 do. He it lc.a•·ins 
hu,,$Clf "ide or<" (or, (ul'IUe p,obl=I" l r1l1tcd 10 l'.loyl\t- lh~, iii tiD)4! po11 I h•d ;c;tl\ Don 101icl1 
~1udrn1& oo 1h~ sllouldtr N >1,m while in 1be Mo\iwd re l.1b. l can ~bo ,r,.:,11 ,b~• ull on• o,:e,1inll, 
r 1t>ld n~~ ll\fol hi should fl()l loveh $1\ldeMJ. even t'n 11\e ii,11 01 ~hl)uldtt. 
l'us1:111illt, I do1>l:,1 lh•I {)on u.·» lf1'108 10 i!\iri.a1t an in1 in1atc ,ehllon.uilp ..,i1h 11',s otvcl<:111 Qr .,11,er 
,1~c1tn1~ I 1'ni11l< h< 11in 10 b~ 0,1 i vcf\' &ielldly ,~d .,~,m b~,lr with •11 11v()co~1. wan1t 10 ~ 11\111 
hie.111l ;ijld doun·1 u11d~1, 11d 1h11 be c1J1 ·11011c\i. ~c word,. or llirpbybody i111g11~oc ,1101 -:rr<'J 
in,1,111• :1 diUC'-lenl k.iod o( ct bu or.ship. 
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P~rsonal and Confidential 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: t3m1da Smith. l'lirector of Human Re.sources 
FROM. Gayne Clifford, Oepar\1llc.nl of 8U£incss and Profcs~ional Prog.r.uns 
SUBJECT: Ob1e1"vMio~ of Mi . ftiis 
DATE: April 21. 2005 
In rc~ponse to our 1ekphonc: conver~atiot11h·1$ momif\~. tl1e following Is o bric( sumrnar)I of wh\\l 
Mr. Kay Nelson QJ!d I "'·imql~ll \11 Dt>n Friis ' offico on. Tuesday. April 26, 2005. 
K.ay c.nd I h11d bun ialhng at:,out l:011,sc me.1ecials in his office Md had moved 01.1! iMs, the 
h.~l)woy .u we were wr~ppin& "P th.: cooveuatlcn. K11y·, of6~ is adjnt<'!l\l to Don's. Don was 
i11 his oflic.e 111ith a ftlllale srndenc. The midtnt \1,1.l.~ wconng II sbon-slccvc blouse ancl shons. 
Don "'115 eppBienl!y ti ~ini: (he 5t\Hlen1 some Jssiitancc on lhc compuier :is sbc was sining in his 
office chair fociog 1l)e co111p.,tcr ,,.no Don wa.< sini11e l!citt to and facint her in !he extra cl1~i., in 
hi$ o ffic,: ~s ~be 11 .. ockcd it c ~e kcybo11td. 
K ~y :lfld I were ju~t out,~i<.lc Don · s o flicc door 61 this point ·a11d ot-served Don as he reached over 
nnd toueh~d wh.1!1 I thou~ht ,-·.~s 1he yirl 's Jes, Doo uicn uid ~omelh.ins to 1he girl thai I ~uld 
1}01 <.HStinsui~h and thci1 rcecl'ied out ns;,.in :i.nd 1ouchcd her up per l11'(1. A 1 \his point Ke.y Md I 
mov~ down the hallway, Kay stopped at 1he rap of t.h.e stairs ~s we were 11.·AI king and 
coml'\Jent~cl io .:i 1·ery lllfPris,,,e man11cr tl,at he couldn'I believe Don actually reached out and 
touchtct rhe ~-i>onit >acly cwo times. 
A~ l rtlat~() tJ,i, obim•o1ion LO J~dy PaJ'kcr la~! ,tighl, J wos llllder the impression tho.\ Don had 
t(luched her le~. In di1c.ussini: th\.• wi1h K:11· rhis roornin/;, l,e h11d l1 bener :i.nsJe of the office than 
l did and hi!> imp1es.ion was chat Don hod iouched the pnpcrs rhc studc.nt h11d on her lap. We 
werr. hc>th in a~eement ho"'e vc, 1ha1 l)on h~d 101,ehcd rhc sir I· s b111e Bnn. 
t'eri:.onal ancl Confidential NIC 503 
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JAMES McMILLAN, 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
415 Seventh Street, Suite 7 
Wallace, Idaho 83873 
Telephone: (208) 752-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 7 52-1900 
ISB # 7523 
Attomey for Plaintiff. 
Jas. McMillan Atty@ Law (4)004 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
Corporation, and DONALD FRlIS, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-71.50 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT NORTH 
IDAHO COLLEGE'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, VICTORIA JOHNSON, by and through her Cowisel of 
Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully submits her 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment as fol.lows; 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The facts as set forth in Plaintiffs Statement of Material Facts, filed on or about 
November 26, 2007 as Docket '·No. 64 in the United States District Court, and submitted 
contemporaneously herewith (see Affidavit of James McMillan, Exhibit A), are hereby expressly 
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incorporaled by reference as though fully set forth herein. The procedural history of this case is 
set forth as follows: 
On or about September 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court setting 
forth claims of sexual harassx:ne:mt in violation of State and Federal statutes, in addition to several 
related common-law tort ,claims .. On October 31, 2006, Defendant Nortb. Idaho College 
(hereinafter ''NIC") sought removal to this Court, on the grounds that the Federal civil rights 
claims constituted a "Federal question" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to which a11 parties 
consented. See Notice of Removal, on file in Idaho Federal District Court Case No. CN-06-436-
E'JL (hereinafter "Federal Proceeding,,) at Docket No. 1. 
Following removal, Defendants filed motions pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
)I . I 
Procedure 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6),''claiming that the Idaho Human Rights complaint was un.ti:mely 
with regard to its ability to serve as. a Notice of Tort Claim as to the com.mon law tort claims, and 
that the Complaint incorrec'tly pied a cause of action pursuant to Title VII of the Federal Civil 
Rights Act (employment discriminat,ion), rather than Title IX (education discrimination). See 
Defendant NIC's FRCP 12(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss and Defendant NIC's FRCP 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss, on file in the Federal Proceeding at Docket Nos. 6 and 5_ Plaintiffs sought to 
amend the Complaint in order to correct the statutory citation, and make the necessary 
allegations in order to state a claim pursuant to Title IX, see Motion to Amend, 0)1 file in the 
,, 
Federal Proceeding at Docket N6. 12, to which Defendants did not object. Defendant NlC;s 
Non-Opposition to Motion to Ame.od, 011 file in the Federal Proceeding at Docket No. 19. Tue 
Ame.oded Complaint rendered Defdndants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Disrnjss as moot, while this Court 
ultimately granted Defendants' t2(b)(l) Motion to Dismiss with regard to the state comm.on law 
M.Blv10RANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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tort claims. See Memorandum Order, on file in the Federal Proceeding at Docket No. 27. 
On or about October 31, 2007, Defendants moved for summary judgment, which was 
. 
granted. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the judgment of the District Court to the Ninth Circuit, 
,· 
see Notice of Appeal, on file in the Federal Proceeding at Docket No.92, resulting in the rever.sal 
of the judgment of the District Court on the issue of respondeat superior pursuant to the Idaho 
Human Rights Act. Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 101. 
Therefore, the issue remaining before this Court is Defendant N.I.C.'s vicarious liability 
pursuant to the Idaho Human Rights, Idaho Code § 67-5901, et seq., and it was upon this 
remaining issue that Defendant NIC renewed its Motion for Summary Judgment Since genuine 
issues exist as to the material facts relating to Defendant NIC's deliberate indifference to 
Defendant Friis' sexual harassment of the Plaintiff pursuant the Idaho Human Rights Act, 
Defendant NIC is not "entitled 'to a judgment as a matter of law," and Defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 
ti. ARGUMENT 
1. Standard for Summary Judement. 
In ruling upon a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must consider whether or not 
''the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is ... [a] genuine issu~s as to ·any material fact," and whether the Defendants are "entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[s]tandards applicable to 
summary judgment require the district court ... to liberally construe facts in the existing record 
in favor o(th.e nonmoving party. and to draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor 
of the n.onmoving party." Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539, 541, 808 P.2d 876, 878 (1991) 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TQ 
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(emphasis added). 
Moreover, in hearing a Motion for Summary Judgment, "it is not the judge's function to 
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue/or trial. There is [an] 
issue for trial [if] there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return 
a verdict for that party." Nels.~n v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 410, 797 P.2d 117, 118 (1990) 
li 
(emphasis added, internal quotations and citations removed). The First Circuit, construing the 
Federal rule upon which the Idaho mle is modeled, further explained the term "genuine" as being 
''sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor either side." 
National Amusements, inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1995). In the same case, it 
further defined "material" as ''a fact that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation 
under the applicable law." Id. To put it another way, as the summary judgment standard is often 
explained by law professors, suromary judgment is appropriate only if "reasonable minds cannot 
differ" as to the position offered ~y the moving party, based upon the evidence available in the 
record. 
Since, based upon _the evidence currently in the record, a rational trier of fact could 
reasonably find: (1) that Friis was acting in a supervisory capacity over Plaintiff; (2) that a 
portion of the acts alleged took place within the scope and course of Friis' employment; (3) that 
adverse educational action was taken against Plaintiff; (4) that Defendant NIC did not exercise 
reasonable care in preventing and correcting the sexually harassing behavior; and (5) that 
Plaintiff did not unreasonably fail to take advantage of preventive or corrective apportunities 
Defendants NJC is not entitled ~o a "judgment· as a matter of law.'' Therefore, Defenda11t's 
Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit Decision is Bindine Upon this Court As Law of the Case. 
Initially, despite the Ninth Circui.t1s ruling, Defendant NIC again attempts to argue that 
(despite the clear language ofldab.o Code §§ 67-5902(10) and 67-5909(7)) that this action is 
governed by the higher standard set=forth under Title IX, rather than Title VIL While it is true 
., 
that the Ninth Circuit's opinion would not be binding upon this court with regard to a separate 
proceeding, i.e .• if it were cited in support of a newly-filed discrimination suit, iu this case it was 
raised on direct appeal from a decision of a court which validly exercised its supplemental 
jurisdiction over said claim, and, as such, the Ninth Circuit's decision is binding upon this Court 
in this case, pursuant to the law of the case doctrine. Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512, 515, 
5 P.3d 973, 976 (2000); Hall v. B/aclcman, 9 Idaho 555, 7S P. 608, 609 (1904) (holding that the 
law of the case applies where the \.question was directly raised upon [the first] appeal, and was 
squarely before the court, and its determination was essential to a determination of that 
,! 
appeal").' 
Even if the Ninth Circuit 'decision is not binding upon this Court, Plaintiff urges this 
Court to adopt the reasoning as set forth in the Ninth Circuit's decision, since, as set forth therein, 
it is clear that the definition of an "educational institution" includes agents of an educational 
institution, Idaho Code §67-5902(10), and that, unlike the federal statutory scheme, the Idaho 
' Human Rights Act treats education discrimination identically. Idaho Code § 67-5909. As such, 
this matter should proceed, pursuant to Plaintiffs Idaho Human Rights Act claim. 
3. That Some of Defendant Friis' Conduct Took Place Within tbe Scope aod Course of 
his Employmept is now the Law of the Case. 
Plaintiff would also note: that, if the Federal decisions regarding the State law claims are not binding upon this 
Court, then the Federal District Court's dismissal of the State Law Tort Claim,f would li'kewise not be binding 
upon this Cowt. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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The mai:o basis of Defendant NIC's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is that "all 
material alleged actions of Donald friis were outside the scope an.d cow-se of his employment," 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 11-14, on file herein, thus 
rendering them not liable pursuant to the Respondeat Superior doctrine. Id. However, on or 
about November 10, 2006, Defendant NIC filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs tort claims (in 
which Defendant Friis joined), on the basis of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Federal Proceeding, 
Docket No. 6. In Defendant NI.C's Memoraudum in Support thereof, it states that the Idaho Tort 
Clrums Act applies to those acts which took place with the scope and course of the tortfeasor-
employee's employment. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 2 (Federal 
Proceeding, Docket No. 6-2). The:Unjted States District Court agreed with the Defendants on 
that regard, over Plaintiff's oppo5i.tion, and proceeded to dismiss Plaintiffs common law tort 
claims (hereinafter "Tort Claims"). Memorandum Order, Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 27. 
This Order was affl11lled by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. (Feder.al Proceeding, Docket No. 101). 
Given that the United States District Court dismissed Plaintiffs Tort Claims pursuant to 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and given that the Idaho Tort Claims act only applies to those acts 
which occur within the scope anlcourse of the offending employee's employment, Idaho Code§ 
6-903, it follows, then, that the federal District Court's dismissal of said claims ·necessarily 
.. 
included au implicit finding that srud acts alleged, if true, took place within the scope and course 
of Defendant Friis' employment. As such, the Ninth Circuit's decision affl11lling said dismissal 
renders this implicit finding as the law of the case; therefore, this Court may not now enter a 
ruling to the contrary. United States v. Park Place Assoc., Ltd., 563 F.3d 907, 925 (2009) ("For a 
prior ruling to become law of the case as to a particular issue, that issue must have been decided 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
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explicitly or by necessary implication m the previous disposition.") (emphasis added). 
Furthen:nore, Defe.udant NIC, having prevailed regarding the dismissal of the Tort Claims on its 
Idaho Tort Claims Act, is now judicially estopped from asserting that the acts alleged did not 
occur within the scope and course of Defendant Friis' employment. New Hampshire v. Maine, 
532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) ("[W]b.~e a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and 
-~ 
succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his inte.rests have 
changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prej Ltd.ice of the party who has 
acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him."). Thus, Defendant NIC is not entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law pi.it~uant to the doctrine of Respondeat Superior, and, therefore, 
Defendant's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 
4, Even if the Issue Re"ardine Scope a.nd Course is Not the Law of Case, There is a 
Genuine Issue of Material Fact Reaardln2 Whether or Not the Allei::ed Acts occurred 
Witbio the Scope and Course of Defeodant Friis' Employment, 
In its Memorandum in. Support of its Renewed Motion, Defendant NIC argues that there 
is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether or JJOt the acts alleged occurred within the 
Scope of Course of Defendant Friis' Employment. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, at 11-14. In support of this proposition, Defendant NIC points to Plaintiffs 
,, 
arguments in opposition to its previous Motion for Summary Judgment, regarding additional acts 
which occurred outs1de the scope and course of Friis' Employment. Id. In fact, while Plaintiff 
did allege acts which took place outside the scope and course of Defendant Friis' employment in 
its Opposition to Defendants' previous Motion for Summary Judgment, it is clear that these are 
additional acts, which took place\n addition to those which took place during Friis' employment 
with Defendant NIC. See Amended Complaint, Docket No. 25; Plaintiffs Statement of Material 
,,. 
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Facts 113--6 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 64). 
For example, Plaintiff all~ges that Defendant Friis made advances upon her during class 
·.\ 
in both 2001 and 2004 at NIC, and that some of the telephone messages did mention school 
related issues. Id. Moreo':'er, giv:n that Plaintiff felt that her grade could be affected by her 
response to Friis' advances, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, 11 6, 8 (Federal Proceeding, Docket 
No. 66), a portion of Defendant Friis' conduct constituted "qujd pr.o quo" sexual harassment, in 
addition to creating a hostile environment. Given that, unquestionably, Defendant Friis' 
authority to grant grades to his students falls within the scope and course of his employment as a 
professor for Defendant N.I.C., Defendant's argument regarding the scope and course of 
emplo)'lTlent must necessarily fail"~ 
In further support of its p_roposition regarding the scope and course of Defendant's 
employment, Defendant NIC relie_s upo:n traditional tests regarding respondeat superior with 
regard to the tortious acts of an employee, which were thoroughly discussed, and ultimately 
' I 
modified, in the Title VII context in the case of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998). In Faragher, the Defendant had raised the defen.se that the offending employee's actions 
did not talce place within the scope and course of his employment, relying upon a test similar to 
that cited by Defendant on Page 6 of its Memorandum. Id. at 775. However, recognizing that 
·, 
'" (hopefully) it would be a rare inst~ce :in which conduct constituting sexual harassment would be 
"connected with the employer's interest," the United States Supreme Court, in Faragher, held 
that, when the offending eniployee i's acting in a supervisory capacity, the employer may be held 
vicariously liable, wi.tbout resort to traditional analyses regarding whether or not the acts fell 
within the scope and course of the employment. Id. at 797-804. 
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As such, a rational trier of fact could reasonably find, from the evidence currently on the 
.,, 
; 
record, that Defendant Friis was in a ''supervisory capacity" over the Plaintiff, thus subjecting it 
to vicarious liability for Friis' ac_tions: There is no question that, in 2004i Defendant Friis, as 
Plaintiffs professor, had the authority to grade her coursework, and, thus, affect her ability to, 
and timing of, graduation. Moreover, as in 2001, Plaintiff testified through her affidavit that, in 
2004, she felt that her grade may be affected if she refused Friis' advances. Affidavit of Victoria 
Johnson, ~~ 6 and 8 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 66). As such, Defendant NIC is not able to 
escape liability for Defendant Friis' acts, absent establishing the affirmative defense, which will 
be addressed below. The~~for.e, Defendant NIC's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
DENIED, and the matter should be allowed to proceed to trial. 
5. Plajotiffs Claim does Not'Fail Under the Faragher Affirmative Defense. 
Next, Defendant NIC resorts to use of the Affirmative Defense set forth in the Faragher 
case. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-19. The affinnative 
defense provided by the U.S. Supreme Court in Faragher provides two elements: "(a) that the 
employer exercised reasonable dare to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing 
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff .... unreasonably failed to take advantage of an.y preventive or 
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid hann otherwise." Faragher, 524 
U.S. at 807. 
In this case, there is a genuine issue of material fact, such that a rational trier of could 
reasonably find, that Defendant NIC di.d not exercise reasonable care in "preventing and 
correcting promptly" Friis' sexually harassing behavior. According to Plaintiffs Affidavit, 
despite being placed on notice of Defendant Friis' behavior, Defendant NIC failed to take any 
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action. Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, , 11 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 66). Furthermore, 
NIC had been placed on notice regarding previous incidents involving other students, and, yet, 
failed to remove Friis from the classroom, provide additional supervision, or othe.rwise provide 
prevent the harassment at issue. Id. at i1~1 12-13 ; Affidavit of Rami Amaro, Exhibits A and B 
(Federal Proceeding, Docket No1 65); Affidavit of Michelle Cook, ~f 6 (Federal Proceeding, 
Docket No. 67). While Defendap.t is certainly free to argue this element of its affinnative 
defense at trial, the record, viewect" in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, does not 
warrant a grant of Summary Judgment upon swd Defense. 
On the second element, again, there is a genuine issue of material fact, such that a 
rational trier of could reasonably find, that Defendant that the plaintiff did not unreasonably fail 
to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to 
avojd harm otheiwise." Initially, ,in addition to the actual notice regarding the harassment of the 
other students, Plaintiff did n.ote her discomfort regarding Fr:ijs' behavior to NIC staff members, 
prior to filing the formal complaint! Affidavit of Victoria Johnson,~[ 11. 
Furthermore, the affirmative defense requires that, even if the Plaintiff failed to take 
advantage of preventive o:r corrective opportunities provided by the employer, that such failure 
be unreasonable. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. As such, Plaintiffs fears that her grade m.ay be 
affected by her response to Fri.is' advances, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ,1 6 and 8 (Federal 
Proceeding, Docket No. 66); in addition to simi.lar fears on the part of other students, see 
Affidavit of Michelle Cook, ~I 5 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 67), and that fact that Plain.tiff 
r: 
believed that she would be required to take Friis' class a pre-requisite to graduation, Affidavit of 
Victoria Johnson, 1 7 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 66) would allow a rational trier of fact to 
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draw a reasonable conclusion that Plaintiff's delay in filing the formal complaint was entirely 
i 
reasonable. Again, while Defendant NIC is perfectly free to argue its affirmative defense at 
trial, the weight of evidence on the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the n.on.-movant, 
does not create a lack of ·a' genuine issue of material fact regarding said defense. As such, 
Summary Judgment, again, is not appropriate regarding Defendants' affirmative defense and, 
therefore, Defendant's Motion should be DENIBD. 
Finally, prior to discussing the Faragher affinnative defense, Defendant NIC argues that 
no adverse educational action was taken. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 16, on file herein. Initially, with regard to adverse action, iu the event that the 
harassment had actually resulted I1~ adverse action, under Faragher, said action would render the 
affirmative defense unavailable. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. In the instant case, a rational trier 
of fact could reasonably find tbat1 the "I'' grade being changed to an "F", as a direct and 
proximate result of Friis' conduc.t, Affidavit of Victoria Jolu1son., ~ 9 (Federal Proceeding, 
" .. 
Docket No. 66) co.nstituted adverse action, which would preclude Defendant NIC's invocation of 
the Affirmative Defense. However, even if this Court should find otherwise, at the very least, 
summary judgment is improper regarding the affirmative defense based upon its elements, as set 
forth above, and, to the extent th~t Defendant NIC may assert the Faragher defense, it should be 
•,. 
required to do so at trial, beforh the finder of fact. As such, Defendant NIC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be DENIED. 
II 
I I 
II 
,I 
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, !ll CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant NIC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be DENIED. 
DATED this J, )'day of August, 2010. 
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Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Case No. CV06-7150 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho corporation, 
and DONALD FRIIS, an individual, 
DEFENDANT NORTH IDAHO 
COLLEGE'S MEMORANDUM IN 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
Defendant North Idaho College ("NIC"), by and through its counsel of record, Naylor & 
Hales, P.C., submits its Memorandum in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to DefendantNIC's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. As demonstrated ~low, and in NIC' s Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgmenti there are no material facts in dispute and NIC is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law on Plaintiffs sole remaining claim. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Regardinii tbe IHRA. 
In Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to this motion for summary judgment, Plamtiff 
invokes the law of the case doctrine to argue that the Ninth Circuit's determination that the Idaho 
Human Rights Act ("IHRA") requires a Title VII analysis with respect to educational discrimination 
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claims is binding upon this Court. Plaintiff's Memo in Opposition, p. 5. While normally the 
substantive ruling of an appellate court does establish the law of a case with regards to any :future 
proceeding in that same case, in this current proceeding there are significant issues of state versus 
federal law that bring into question the precedential value of a Ninth Circuit ruling regarding Idaho 
state law over that of an Idaho state court itself. 
In ruling upon the IHRA's provision, the Ninth Circuit was clearly interpreting Title 67, 
Chapter 59 of the Idaho Code. This is unquestionably a state law issue. The court that has ultimate 
legal authority to decide what Idaho state statutes mean is not the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court has established that it "has the ultimate responsibility to construe 
legislative language." Mulder v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Co., 135 Idaho 52, 57 (2000). "We hold that 
this Court has inherent power to render decisions regarding Idaho law." Sunshine Mining Co. v. 
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Idaho 133, 136 (1983). 
In fact, the Ninth Circuit itself has long followed the practice of certifying unclear questions 
of state law to the Idaho Supreme Court for a determination of those issues. In Toner for Toner v. 
Lederle Laboratories, Div. of American Cyanamid Co., 779 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) the 
Ninth Circuit ruled: 
We use our discretion to certify four questions to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Certification provides a means to obtain authoritative answers to unclear questions 
of state law. Pursuant to Idaho procedure, we find that the following questions 
constitute "controlling questions oflaw as to which there is no controlling precedent 
in the decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court" and that "an immediate determination 
of the Idaho law with regard to these questions would materially advance the orderly 
resolution of the litigation." 
( Citations omitted.) In this present case, the Ninth Circuit did not certify the question of whether the 
IHRA provides respondeat superior liability as to education discrimination claims. Rather, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled on its own what it believed the IHM to mean. 
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More so, once the Ninth Circuit so ruled on the IHRA, and then remanded the case back to 
the U.S. District Court, that court then remanded the case back to state court without any further 
determination of the Plaintiff's IHRA claim, finding that a state court was the better venue in which 
to have this question resolved. See Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support ofMotionfor Summary 
Judgment, Exh. N, p. 3 (holding "remand is particularly appropriate in this instance because 
application of the IHRA in the context of educational discrimination has not been, as far as the Court 
is aware, the subject of jurisprudence by the Idaho Supreme Court or Idaho Court of Appeals"). 
Given this procedural history, the Ninth Circuit's ruling bas ultimately been handed not to 
a U.S. District Court to carry out, but to this Court. This Court has no appellate relationship to the 
Ninth Circuit. Rather, this Court's appellate superior is the Idaho Supreme Court, the court 
possessing ultimate authority to interpret the IT-IRA. Where that is the case, this Court-as a state 
district court interpreting state law-has the right to pass upon questions of state law that will be 
ultimately reviewed by the Idaho Supreme Court wi1h final authority on the matter. 
B. Acts Not Within Course and Scope of Friis's EmploymenJ; 
With regards to the question of whether any of the allegedly harassing actions of Defendant 
Don Friis were outside the course and scope of his employment, Defendant NIC acknowledges that 
the authority cited by Plaintiff with regards to Title VII does hold that when a supervisor is alleged 
to have sexually harassed an employee, the course and scope of employment question is dealt with 
differently than anonnal respondeat superior analysis that would pertain to other workplace issues. 
The U.S. Supreme Court case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), which 
was decided as a companion case on the same day as Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998), contains an analysis regarding the question of whether a supervisor's alleged sexual 
harassment can be deemed to be within the course ru:id scope of his or her employment. This analysis 
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ultimately concluded in that court's detennination that agency issues relating to the co1.u-se and scope 
of employment question for supervisor sexual harassment cases are to be dealt with and accounted 
for in the affirmative defense offered in Faragher. 
The Ellerth Court held: "In order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious liability 
for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VII' s equally basic policies of 
encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting e1nployees, we adopt the · 
following holding in this case and in Faragher[], also decided today." 524 U.S. at 764. TheEllerth 
Court then set forth the Faragher/Ellerth affinnative defense when a supervisor is alleged to have 
sexually harassed an employee under his supervision: 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an 
actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor with immediate ( or 
successively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible employment 
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense comprises 
two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent 
and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff 
employee unreasonably failed to talce advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. While proof that 
an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is 
not necessary in every instances as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy 
suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be address ed. in any case 
when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee 
failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not 
limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided 
by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will nonnally suffice to satisfy the 
employer's burden under the second element of the defense. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Thus, any consideration of whether the allegedly harassing supervisor was 
acting within the course and scope of his employment is subsumed in the Faragher/Ellerth 
affirmative defense. If the employee suffered some adverse employment action as a result of the 
harassment, then the affinnative defense is not available, as "a tangible employment action taken by 
the supervisor becomes for Title VII pmposes the act of the employer." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763. 
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If the employee suffered no adverse employment action as a result of the harassment, then any 
exemption from liability or damages for the employer that may arise form the agency principles at 
the core of a course and scope of employment analysis can be realized by the employer through 
utilizing the Faragher!Ellerth affirmative defense, 
Thusi the real issue in Defendant NIC' s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment is whether 
the Plaintiff has produced evidence on summazy judgment that creates a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the Faragher!Ellerth affirmative defense proffered by NIC. 
c. There Are No Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remaining 
Plaintiff attempts to argue that, pertaining to the Faragher!Ellerth affirmative defense, there 
remain genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. These arguments are 
unavailing given the established factual history of this case. 
1. Claims From 2001 
Plaintiff alludes in her Memorandum in Opposition to alleged actions of Friis that took place 
during the Fall 2001 class. However, any and all claims relating to the Fall 2001 semester-including 
those involving the IHRA-are plainly barred by the applicable statute oflimitations. Plaintiff's sole 
remaining claim comes through the IBRAi which specifically requires a claimant to bring a 
complaint of discrimination within one (1) year of tb.e alleged unlawful discrimination. I.C. § 67-
5907(1). Johnson failed to file her IHRC Charge of Discrimination until May 2005, several years 
after the alleged actions of Don Friis in 2001. Defendant NIC's Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts. ("SOF")1 ,r 22. 
2. Friis Analogized as Johnso.n,'s Supervisor 
NIC itself has stated that in the current case it is likely that Friis would be treated as 
Johnson's supervisor for purposes of this education·Title VII analogy. NIC's Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgmenti p. 16. Thus, NIC has already acknowledged that the 
Faragher!Ellerth affirmative defense is proper here. 
3, Plaintiffs Remainin2 Claim Fails Under NIC's Faragher Affirmative Defense 
Plaintiff attempts to rebut NIC1 s asserted affirmative defense based on the Faragher decision. 
Plaintiff alleges that: (1) NIC did nothing in response to Johnson's claims of harassment against 
Friis, and (2) that Johnson did not Wl!easonably fail to take advantage of the preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by NIC. Both claims are clearly and flatly contradicted by the evidence that 
has been established in the record. 1 
a. NIC Exercised Reasonable Care to Correct t,he Alleged Behavior 
Johnson argues that "despite being placed on notice of Defendant Friis's behavior, 
Defendant NIC failed to take any action." Johnson's Memo. in Opp., pp. 9-10. This 
statement-based solely on Johnson's post-deposition affidavit on summary judgment-fails to take 
into account the multitude of evidence provided by NIC on summary judgment, which evidence 
includes Johnson's own deposition testimony. The record is abundantly clear that when Johnson 
first communicated to any NIC official that she believed Donald Friis had been sexually harassing 
her-which first communication took place in January 2005 to NIC counselor Judy Bundy-NIC took 
quick and decisive action to investigate Johnson's allegations and then to take actions based on the 
ultimate :findings of the NIC Sexual Harassment Advisory Committee ("SHAC"). SOP ,i,r 17- 20. 
When Judy Bundy first heard of Friis' s alleged behavior, she communicated to Johnson that she was 
obligated to report these allegations to NIC. SOF ~ 18. Bundy then took these allegations to the NIC 
1Defendant NIC also asserts that Plaintiff's allegations here are both barred by the law of 
the case doctrine where the U.S. District Court explicitly found to the contrary in its decision on 
the matter as noted herein. 
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Affumative Action officer Brenda Smith, who followed up with Johnson regarding the allegations 
and subsequently informed Johnson of her right to make a formal Mitten complaint against Friis for 
se>..-ual harassment. Id. Once Johnson made the fonnal complaint Smith convened the SHAC despite 
the fact that Johnson's complaint of sexual harassment was untimely (SOF ~ 21), and after its full 
investigation of the matter the SHAC recommended the strongest punishment against Friis. SOF 
~, 19-20. Upon receiving that reconunendation, NIC President Michael Burke offered Friis the 
option of resigning his position in lieu of termination, which Friis then did. SOF , 20. Thus, 
Johnson's claim that "NIC failed to take any action" in response to Johnson's allegations is 
frivolous. And, in fact, the U.S. District Court specifically found that NIC's actions taken in 
response to Johnson's complaint of sexual harassment were adequate and compliant with the law, 
See A/fidavir of Bruce J. Castleton in Support ofNIC 's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex.h. K, pp. 
14-16. 
Johnson's next claim-that '1NIC had been placed on notice regarding previous 
incidents involving other students"-is likewise baseless. The U.S. District Court specifically found 
that the 2004 report by a male student to Brenda Smith that Friis was invading his personal space 
"was inadequate to put NIC on notice for several reasons." Castleton Afj., Exh. K, p. 13. Toe 
reports submitted by other faculty who reported seeing Friis touch a student "are not relevant to 
determination of the issue at hand .. , given they occurred after NIC already had actual notice" of 
Johnson's allegations. Id at p. 14. These claims by Johnson and the evidence surrounding them 
have already been reviewed by the U.S. District Court and found insufficient to survive summary 
judgment. 
Thus, Johnson has failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact on summaxy 
judgment rebutting the fust prong of the Faragher affinnative defense, and the evidence is 
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uncontradicted that NIC exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually 
hanu;sing behavior. 
b. Johnson Unreasonably Failed to Take Advantage of NIC Processes 
As to the second prong of the Faragher affinnative defense, Johnson was required 
"to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages that 
result from violations of [Title VII]"). Holly D. v. Calif. Inst. ofTech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2003) (holding that W1iversity employee's failure to report sexual harassment until a full year after 
unwelcomed sexual activity was unreasonable despite employee's belief that one department of the 
university had not satisfactorily addressed a prior disability discrimination complaint). Typically, 
"a demonstration of a failure to [use a complaint procedure] will normally suffice to satisfy the 
employer's burden under the second element of the [Faragher/Elletth] defense," Id. 
In response to NIC' s claim that John.son failed take advantage of NIC sexual 
harassment complaint procedures, Johnson claims that she did not unreasonably fail to take 
advantage of such procedures provided by NIC. Johnson maintains that her actions in informing 
certain NIC employees of her discomfort with Friis prior to filing her foxmal complaint of 
harassment in February 2005 constituted an attempt on her part to comply with NIC sexual 
harassment reporting procedwes. Memo, Opp,, p. 10. The U.S. District Court has already 
determined that Johnson's actions in commwiicating mere discomfort with Friis to Judy Bundy, Judy 
Beckendorf, and Sharon Olson do not constitute a complaint of sexual harassment. "A comment 
made by a student that her professor makes her 'uncomfortable,' without more detail, cannot be 
equated to a complaint of sexual harassment." Castleton Alf, Exh. K, p. 13. 
Plaintiff also maintains that her failure to make a complaint of sexual harassment until 
February 2005 was not unreasonable where she claims that she feared her grade would be affected 
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by Friis's advances. Memo. Opp., pp. 10-11. However, the U.S. District Court has also already 
specifically dismissed that claim, observing in Johnson's own deposition testimony that "Johnson 
stated that this was just a feeling, a.s Friis never communicated this to her." Castleton Aff., Ex:h. K, 
n.2. Thus, this statement cannot serve to create a genuine issue of material fact now. 
Likewise, the statement of Michelle Cook in her affidavit that Cook feared for her 
grade also cannot justify Johnson's delay in waiting to report the alleged harassment, as Cook's own 
affidavit fails to set forth any more of a valid factual basis for her purported concern for her grad.e 
in Friis' s class than Johnson's own claim has. Cook s~ forth no actual facts in her affidavit that 
support her purported belief that her grade could be affected by how she responded to Friis. Further, 
Cook states in her affidavit that she only took a class from Friis in 2001, which would make her 
statements irrelevant to Johnson's 2004 elai:01s. See Affidavit of Michelle Cook in Opp. to 
Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment,, 5. Johnson has entirely failed to set forth any viable 
evidence on summary judgment indicating that Donald Friis ever made any statement or took any 
action indicating to Johnson (or Cook) that her grade could possibly be impacted by Johnson's 
reactions to Friis's requests to date her. 
On summary judgment "[t]he adverse party ... may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must 
set forth specific facts sho-wing there is a genuine issue for trial," Brewer v, Washington RSA No. 
8 Ltd. Partnership, 145 Idaho 7356, 739 {2008). Johnson cannot survive summary judgment with 
nothing but her own subjective, conclusory assumptions about Friis's intent absent some actual 
evidence to support that belief. The U.S. District Court specifically noted that Johnson testified at 
deposition that Friis never communicated to her that her grade could be affected by her reaction to 
bis requests. Castleton A.ff., Exh. K, n.2. Thus, she cannot create a genuine issue of material fact 
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on summary judgment by simply claiming that she believed something despite a complete lack of 
evidence to support that belief. 
c. There Was No Adverse Educational Action 
And, Johnson asserts that she did experience an adverse educational action when her 
"I'' incomplete grade in Friis's class was changed to an "F" in October 2004. Memo. Opp., p. 11. 
Johnson claims that "a rational trier of fact could reasonably find that the "I', grade being changed 
to an. "F," as a direct and proximate result ofFriis's conduct. Id. This statement is belied by the 
weight of great evidence produced on summary judgment, as the U.S. District Court has also found 
(observing"(i]n Johnson's deposition, she testified that she now believes her grade was changed 
because she did not finish the class work within a certain amount of time'J. Castleton A.ff., Exh. K, 
n. 7. At deposition Johnson was asked: 
Q: Well, let me just ask you: You believe that [Friis] gave you an F because you 
didn't give into his advances; is that correct? 
A. I did believe that. 
Q: Has anything come to your attention that would make you believe or that 
would suggest that it wasn't Mr. Friis who changed your grade from an 
incomplete to an F? 
A. Yes. 
Q: And what was that? 
A: That - I guess that there was a- I haven't read it, but you have to do the work 
within a certain amount of time or something like that. 
Castleton AJ)., Exhibit A (Johnson Depo. pp. 184:24 - 185: 11 ). The NlC Sexual Harassment 
Advisory Committee-the very NIC body that found against Friis and recommended the strongest 
possible sanction against him-specifically found through its investigation that "Victoria's incomplete 
automatically defaulted to an 'F' six weeks into the fall semester. There is no indication of any grade 
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retaliation." Castleton Ajf, Exh. E (NIC 53). Johnson has failed to set forth any evidence 
whatsoever on summary judgment to rebut this, Accordingly, her claim that a reasonable juror could 
find contrary to the plain and uncontradieted evidence is meritless. 
d. Johnson's Claims Mnst Be Dismisseq on Sum,roa,rx Ju,dgment 
Johnson concludes by arguing that "to the extent that Defendant NIC may assert the 
Faragher defense, it should be required to do so at trial, before the finder of fact." Memo. Opp., p. 
11. This argument ignores the fact that Johnson is required to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the affirmative defenses raised by NIC to survive summary judgment, just as she is required 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of her own cause of action. The Ninth 
Circuit has specifically upheld the dismissal of a Title VII claim based on the Faragher/Ellerth 
affumative defense on summary judgment where the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the Faragher elements. See Holly D. v. Calif. Inst. O/Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding "because (the plaintiff] has not presented evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact either on her 'tangible employment action' claim or on Caltech's 
affirmative defense to her hostile environment claim, we affinn the district court's grant of summary 
judgment to Caltech on her Title VII claim"). 
Accordingly, J obnson' s failure to bring forth evidence on summary judgment that 
creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the Faragher/Ellerth affinnative defense must result 
in the dismissal of Johnson's IIDlA claims on summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Defendant NIC asks that this Court dismiss Johnson's IHRA.. claim on swnmary 
judgment with prejudice. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNT OF KOOTENAI 
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) 
) CASE NO. CV-06-7150 
) 
vs. 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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Corporation; and DONALD FRIIS, an 
individual, 
) COLLEGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
----------------) 
James M. McMillan, for Plaintiff 
Bruce J. Castleton, NAYLOR & HALES, P.C., for Defendant North Idaho College 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The basis of this lawsuit is the alleged sexual harassment of Plaintiff Victoria 
Johnson ("Johnson") by Donald Friis ("Friis"), formerly a professor at Defendant North 
Idaho College ("NIC"). Johnson, a non-traditional student at age forty-four, began 
attending NIC in the Fall of 2001. The alleged sexual harassment began that Fall when 
Johnson was enrolled in Friis' introductory computer class. Johnson alleges that, during 
this computer class, Friis flirted with her and generally acted inappropriately toward her, 
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and that he went to breakfast with her and a fellow student. At this breakfast, Friis 
allegedly inquired about Johnson's dating situation, to which Johnson replied that she 
was not interested in dating and wanted to focus on school. Johnson alleges that, after 
this incident, Friis treated her negatively, degrading and humiliating her. She further 
alleges that Friis indicated her grade would be affected by her response to his actions, 
although Johnson's deposition testimony is that this was just her feeling. According to 
Johnson, this behavior, among other causes, forced her to withdraw from this class. 
Following the Fall 2001 semester, Johnson lost her financial aid because she 
failed to complete the required number of classes during the semester. Johnson then met 
with Judy Bundy, her counselor at NIC, to discuss her options. At this meeting, Johnson 
told Ms. Bundy that Friis made her uncomfmiable. 
In January of 2004, Johnson met with Judy Beckendorf, an academic advisor at 
NIC, to enroll for the Spring 2004 semester. Ms. Beckendorf suggested to Johnson that 
she needed to complete the introductory computer class. Johnson was informed that Friis 
would again teach this class, and Johnson enrolled in the class hoping that his behavior 
would improve. Instead, Friis' alleged behavior, which persisted during the Spring of 
2004, was that Friis was overly nice to Johnson, flirting with her and inappropriately 
touching her. 
During the Spring 2004 semester, Johnson hired Sharon Olson, Friis' teaching 
assistant, as a tutor. At some point, Johnson informed Ms. Olson that Friis made her 
uncomfo1iable; however, Johnson did not state that she believed Friis was engaging in 
sexual harassment of her. 
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After the mid-term of the Spring 2004 semester, Johnson stopped attending class 
and did not complete any assignments. Johnson then requested that Friis provide her 
with a grade of "incomplete" and Friis agreed to do so, even though Johnson had not 
completed the required class work and had a grade of "D-" at the mid-term. Pursuant to 
NIC policy, the "incomplete" grade automatically changed to a grade of "F" due to 
Johnson not completing the class within the required academic time period. 
Johnson alleges that Friis contacted her several times over the Summer of 2004, 
while her grade was still pending, asking her out on dates and leaving her inappropriate 
messages. Johnson then met again with Judy Bundy to discuss emolling at NIC for the 
Spring 2005 semester. At this meeting Ms. Bundy informed Johnson that her 
"incomplete" grade had converted into an "F." Johnson then informed Ms. Bundy of the 
alleged sexual harassment by Friis and felt, incorrectly, that the grade change was a result 
of Friis' retaliation. Ms. Bundy informed Johnson that due to what Johnson had told her 
she was obligated to report Friis' behavior to NIC. 
Ms. Bundy contacted Brenda Smith, NI C's affirmative action officer charged with 
receiving reports of sexual harassment. Ms. Smith informed Johnson that Johnson could 
make a formal complaint, and Johnson did so, filing her formal complaint in February 
2005. Further, Smith followed NIC policy by informing Friis of the allegations and 
giving him an opportunity to respond; Smith also convened NIC's Sexual Harassment 
Advisory Committee ("SHAC") to investigate the allegations. The SHAC dete1mined 
that Friis had violated NI C's sexual harassment policy by asking Johnson out on dates 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
SCRffi6rnE-0l'l!IDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page2'76fcSf 323 
while controlling her grade, and recommended the strongest possible sanction 1• Further, 
the SHAC determined that no grade retaliation had taken place. 
In May of 2005, Johnson filed an administrative complaint with the Idaho Human 
Rights Commission ("IHRC") alleging discrimination against NIC. Johnson then filed 
her Complaint within the 9O-day right to sue period in the District Court for the First 
Judicial District for the State of Idaho, Kootenai County, which was removed, by 
stipulation of the parties, to the Federal District Court for Idaho based on federal question 
jurisdiction. The Complaint included several claims against both NIC and Friis, 
including Negligent Supervision/Hiring/Retention against NIC and Sexual Harassment, 
Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Gender Discrimination in 
Violation of Title IX of the Federal Civil Rights Act and the Idaho Human Rights Act 
("IHRA"), Assault and Battery, and punitive damages against Friis and NIC as Friis' 
employer. 
Defendants NIC and Friis filed Motions to Dismiss all tort allegations based on 
Johnson's failure to satisfy the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The 
Federal District Court granted the Motions to Dismiss, finding that Johnson had failed to 
satisfy the notice requirement of the Act. Defendants NIC and Friis then filed Motions 
for Summary Judgment on the remaining Title IX and IHRA claims. The Federal District 
Court determined that Title IX standards applied to NIC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Johnson's claim under the IHRA, and granted in total NIC's and Friis' 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
1 Eventually, NIC offered Friis the option of resignation in lieu of termination, which he accepted. He left 
N[C in June 2005. All Johnson's claims against Friis, individually, were dismissed by the Federal District 
Court ofldaho. 
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Johnson then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
That court affirmed the Federal District Comt's granting of summary judgment to both 
Defendants, with the exception that summary judgment for NIC on Johnson's IHRA 
claim was reversed. The Ninth Circuit determined that the applicable standard to apply 
to the IHRA claim was a Title VII standard allowing for respondeat superior liability. 
That sole issue was remanded to the Federal District Court for further proceedings, and 
that court remanded the issue to this Court. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c); Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). In 
ruling upon a motion for summary judgment, all disputed facts are to be construed 
liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Bonz, 119 Idaho 
at 541, 808 P .2d at 878. The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the 
moving party. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 
365 (1969). 
Once the moving party has properly supported the motion for summary judgment 
with affidavits, admissions or depositions, it is incumbent on the nonmoving party to 
present opposing evidence through depositions, discovery responses and affidavits 
sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
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4 77 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Petricevich, 92 
Idaho at 868, 452 P .2d at 365. 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving pa1iy's case must 
consist of more than speculation, it must create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). A 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue. Id. If the evidence 
presented by the nonmoving party fails to raise a genuine issue for trial, summary 
judgment shall be entered against that party. I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
In considering the evidence presented in support of or opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment "a court will consider only that material contained in affidavits or 
depositions which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admissible at 
trial." Petricevich, at 869, 452 P.2d (1969); I.R.C.P. 56(e). When there is a conflict in 
the evidence which is presented, a determination should not be made on summary 
judgment if the credibility can be tested by testimony in court before the trier of fact. 
Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 691 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App. 1984). 
The purpose of summary judgment proceedings is to eliminate the necessity of 
trial where facts are not in dispute and where existent and undisputed facts lead to a 
conclusion of law which is certain. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 444, 690 P .2d 896 
(1984). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. IT IS AJ>PROPRIATE IN THIS CASE TO APPLY TITLE VII 
STANDARDS TO THE IHRA CLAIM 
Despite the Ninth Circuit ruling, NIC argues that Johnson's IHRA claim is 
governed by the more restrictive Title IX standards, as opposed to the Title VII standards 
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that allow for respondeat superior liability. This Court concludes that it is appropriate to 
apply the Title VII standard in the instant situation. The IHRA provides a private right of 
action for money damages against "educational institutions" that discriminate on the 
basis of gender, I.C. § 67-5909(7), and defines "educational institution" to include "an 
agent of an educational institution," LC. § 67-5902(10). Such language provides for 
respondeat superior liability. 
B. TITLE VII ANALYSIS 
NIC argues that, even under a Title VII analysis, Johnson must show that Friis' 
conduct was within the scope and course of his employment, and that Johnson must 
establish evidence that puts at issue the elements of the so-called "Faragher" affirmative 
defense. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), provides for the 
affirmative defense to gender discrimination in employment contexts, if the employer 
(educational institution) took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct a 
discriminatory situation, and the employee (student) unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer 
(educational institution) to avoid harm. 
1. Scope of Employment 
This Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact about whether Friis' 
alleged discriminatory conduct occurred within the scope of his employment. This is so 
even if the analysis includes only those alleged acts between January of 2004 and Friis' 
resignation in June of 2005. 
There are facts in the record by which a reasonable trier of fact, here a jury, could 
conclude that Friis engaged in discriminatory conduct in the overall context of a teacher-
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student relationship, that some of the alleged misconduct occurred in a classroom setting, 
and that some of the alleged conduct occuned while Friis had control of Johnson's grade. 
The nexus of the relationship between Johnson and Friis is her status as student and his 
status as instructor. 
2. Faragher Affirmative Defense 
The record before this Court is clear that NIC took reasonable care to prevent and 
promptly correct such an alleged discriminatory situation; however, this Court finds the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact as to whether Johnson acted reasonably to 
take advantage of preventative or conective opportunities provided by NIC. This Comt 
cannot say, from a standard of viewing the record in the light most favorable to Johnson, 
that her conduct was unreasonable as a matter of law. 
The road to Johnson's education goals seemed to lead inexorably through Friis' 
computer class. A reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson was justified in the hope 
that Friis' behavior in class would improve in the Spring of 2004, and that Friis was 
conferring a benefit to Johnson by allowing an incomplete grade when she requested one. 
The jury could conclude that, in light of Johnson needing Friis' cooperation in that 
"incomplete" grade, that it was understandable that she did not fully disclose Friis' 
conduct to NIC until she learned her ''incomplete" grade had been converted to an "F." 
At that point it appears she believed, although mistakenly, that Friis' behavior had 
prejudiced her educational efforts in a very concrete way. 
Thus, this Court finds the record to contain genuine issues of material fact 
regarding NIC's Faragher affirmative defense. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
For the above stated reasons, this Court DENIES Defendant NI C's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact as to: 
1. Did Friis' alleged conduct occur within the course and scope of his 
employment?; and, 
2. Did Johnson unreasonably fail to take advantage of any preventative or 
corrective opportunities provided by NIC to avoid harm, as required by 
Faragher? 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant NIC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
DATED this J2 day of October, 2010. 
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Defendant North Idaho College, by and through its counsel ofrecord, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 
hereby files its Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's October 15,2010 Memorandum Decision 
and Order re: Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for Summary Judgment. This motion is 
made pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule l l(a)(2)(B). For the reasons stated below, Defendant North Idaho 
College ("NIC") respectfully requests the Court to reconsider its prior decision and grant summary 
judgment to NIC on Plaintiffs remaining claim. 
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I. 
THE ISSUE OF COURSE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT IS SUBSUMED WITHIN 
THE FARAGHERIELLERTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE DOCTRINE 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order this Court found a genuine issue of material fact as 
to whether the acts of alleged harassment by Defendant Don Friis occurred within the course and 
scope of his employment with NIC. Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 7-8. Admittedly, 
Defendant NIC raised the issue of the course and scope of Friis's actions in its initial summary 
judgment briefing. NIC initially argued that all pertinent actions of Defendant Friis vis-a-vis 
Johnson's allegations of sexual harassment occurred outside the course and scope of Friis's 
employment as an instructor for NIC, and therefore NIC should not be liable for the same. 
However, Plaintiff Johnson responded to this argument in her Opposition to Defendant North 
Idaho College's Motion for Summary Judgment by pointing out that under the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1988), when the alleged harasser is in a 
supervisory position over the victim, the issue of course and scope of an alleged harasser's 
employment is subsumed into the Faragher affirmative defense afforded employers under Title VII 
(arguing "when the offending employee is acting in a supervisory capacity, the employer may be held 
vicariously liable, without resort to traditional analyses regarding whether or not the acts fell within 
the scope and course of the employment." (Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 8.) 
NIC then acknowledged in its summary judgment reply brief that Johnson was correct in this 
asse1tion. NIC cited to the U.S. Supreme Court case of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 
U.S. 775 (1998), which is the companion case to Faragher. Ellerth sets forth that under Title VII 
cases of this sort, if the employee suffered some adverse employment action as a result of the sexual 
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harassment of a supervisor, then "a tangible employment action taken by the supervisor becomes for 
Title VII purposes the act of the employer." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763, quoted in NI C's Memorandum 
in Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply 
Memorandum"), p. 4. If, on the other hand, there was no adverse employment action, then the 
employer is allowed to attempt to prove the Faragher affirmative defense elements. Thus, the 
question of whether the harassing supervisor acted within the course and scope of his/her employer 
is determined through the employer's use of the Faragher affirmative defense. See NI C's Reply 
Memorandum, pp. 3-5. 
As such, the parties (and this Comi) need not attempt to establish whether Friis's conduct 
fell within the course and scope of his employment. NIC's attempt to assert the Faragher 
affirmative defense establishes the same claim to protection from liability from Johnson's claims. 
Under the Faragher Title VII analysis-which analysis is the established Title VII respondeat 
superior test when a supervisor is alleged to have harassed a subordinate-there is no independent 
element regarding course and scope of employment of the harasser's actions. Rather, Faragher 's 
elements control. 
Accordingly, this Court's finding ofa genuine issue of material fact regarding the course and 
scope of Friis's employment is unnecessary, and Defendant NIC asks this Court to reconsider its 
prior Memorandum Decision and omit the same. NIC is no longer raising any independent defense 
regarding the course and scope of Friis's actions, as NIC is relying instead upon the Faragher 
framework for a resolution of Plaintiff's respondeat superior claim. 
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II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW JOHNSON UNREASONABLY FAILED 
TOT AKE ADV ANT AGE OF CORRECTIVE PROCEDURES PROVIDED BY 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE 
This Comi found in its Memorandum Decision and Order that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether Plaintiff Johnson unreasonably failed to take advantage of NIC's 
corrective procedures to cure Friis's alleged harassment. This Court found: 
The road to Johnson's educational goals seemed to lead inexorably through Friis's 
computer class. A reasonable jury could conclude that Johnson was justified in the 
hope that Friis's behavior in class would improve in the Spring of 2004, and that 
Friis was conferring a benefit upon Johnson by allowing an incomplete grade when 
she requested one. The jury could conclude that, in light of Johnson needing Friis's 
cooperation in that "incomplete" grade, that it was understandable that she did not 
fully disclose Friis's conduct to NIC until she learned her "incomplete" grade had 
been converted to an "F." At that point it appears she believed, although mistakenly, 
that Friis' behavior had prejudiced her educational efforts in a very concrete way. 
Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 8. This Court appears to hold above that Johnson's delay in 
reporting Friis' s harassment may be deemed by a jury to be reasonable because (1) Johnson believed 
Friis's behavior towards her would improve in the Spring 2004 class in comparison to his behavior 
during the Fall 2001 class; (2) Friis was conferring a benefit upon Johnson by giving her the "I" 
grade when it was in contravention of campus policies; (3) Johnson needed Friis's cooperation in 
getting the "I" grade, she feared he may withdraw that benefit to her if she reported his behavior; and 
( 4) it was not until Johnson believed Friis had prejudiced her educational efforts in a concrete way 
that she would be inclined to report his prior behavior. It is Defendant's contention that none of 
these reasons can, as a matter oflaw-and assuming the truthfulness of the facts alleged and viewing 
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all relevant evidence in a light most favorable to Johnson-constitute a reasonable delay in reporting 
Friis's behavior. 1 
In defining the Defendant's arguments here, it is important to set forth the rationale behind 
the Faragher affirmative defense. This defense is-as the Court is well aware-an affirmative defense 
to a claim of respondeat superior liability. In this setting, NIC is contending that it never had notice 
ofFriis's alleged harassment of Johnson until an actual report of harassment was made in January 
2005 (to which NIC responded quickly and adequately). The two elements of the Faragher 
affirmative defense are that (1) NIC had policies and procedures in place to address claims of 
harassment, and (2) Johnson unreasonably failed to utilize these. Thus, Faragher is meant to 
provide a means by which the employer-or NIC, in this case by legal analogy-can stop and mitigate 
any harm that is occurring as a result of the harassment of one of its employees before that behavior 
becomes severe or pervasive. By providing an anti-harassment policy and making sure its students 
and staff were well aware ofit, NIC was affirmatively establishing its opposition to such harassment 
and notifying students and staff how they could report the harassment to NIC and allow NIC to end 
the harassment. 
However, in order for the harassment to truly be stopped, Faragher then places the 
responsibility upon the victim to come forth and report the harassment promptly so that NIC can then 
take steps to stop it. If the victim fails to take advantage of the processes afforded by NIC, then 
1Defendant NIC also notes that the only reasons given by Plaintiff in her Opposition to 
NIC's Motion for Summary Judgment as to why her delay in reporting was reasonable was that 
( 1) she feared her grade may be affected by her response to Friis' s advances, and (2) she believed 
she would be required to take Friis's class as a prerequisite to graduation. Plaintiffs Opp. To 
NI C's MSJ, p. 10-1 I. These two reasons, taken together at face value, constitute a fear of 
retaliation, in that Johnson feared Friis would give her a negative grade in a class she needed to 
graduate if she didn't respond appropriately to his advances. 
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under Faragher NIC cannot be held liable for the harassment (if it did not otherwise know about it). 
See Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. a/Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the second 
prong of Faragher "is intended to fulfill a policy imported from the general theory of damages, that 
a victim has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize 
the damages that result from violations of the statute" ( emphasis added) ).2 This is why the second 
prong of Faragher is typically satisfied by a showing that the employee failed to utilize the 
employer's complaint procedure. Id; see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08. This is key, because 
if the victim does not promptly report the harassment, NIC cannot mitigate the harm done by the 
harasser. Thus, Faragher shields NIC from any liability for damages that would not have occurred 
had the victim promptly reported the harassment. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the second Faragher prong as 
follows: 
The rules of [Faragher and Ellerth] place obligations and duties not only on the 
employer but also on the employee. One of the primary obligations that the 
employee has under those rules is to take full advantage of the employer's 
preventative measures. The genius of the Faragher-Ellerth plan is that the 
corresponding duties it places on the employers and employees are designed to stop 
sexual harassment before it reaches the severe or pervasive stage amounting to 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. But that design only works if employees 
report harassment promptly, earlier instead of later, and the sooner the better. 
Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 FJd 1287, 1306-07 (11 th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added). In other words, the employee-or in this case, Johnson-hinders and even nullifies the very 
2Defendant NIC cites to federal case law analyzing Faragher and Ellerth because there 
are no Idaho state court cases dealing with the same to Defendant's knowledge. Further, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has consistently stated that Idaho Code § 67-5901 (the statement of 
purpose of the Idaho Human Rights Act) "allows our state courts to look to federal law for 
guidance when interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act." Stout v. Key Training Corp., 144 
Idaho 195, 197 (2007). 
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protections created for her when she fails to promptly report the harassing behavior directed towards 
her. 
In this case, Victoria Johnson waited until well after Friis' s behavior towards her had stopped 
completely before she reported it to NIC. Johnson claims Friis began his harassment of her in the 
Fall 2001 semester, and then again during the Spring 2004 semester, and during the summer of 2004. 
In August 2004, Johnson communicated her disapproval ofFriis's behavior to him, after which Friis 
never contacted her again. Then,five months transpired during which there was no contact between 
Friis and Johnson, let alone any harassing behavior. Thus, when Johnson finally reported Friis's 
behavior to NIC there was no longer any ongoing harassment to attempt to curtail. The damage had 
already been done, and NIC had no way of stopping it. See Mukaida v. Hawaii, 159 F.Supp.2d 1211, 
1231 (D.Hawaii 2001) (observing "[b ]ecause she waited until the harassment had ended, [the 
plaintiff] never gave the State or UH an opportunity to correct the alleged sexual harassment," 
finding the plaintiffs delay in reporting unreasonable). 
A. Fear of Retaliation is Unreasonable as a Matter of Law 
This Court and Johnson both cite Johnson's fear that Friis may take away her "I" grade as 
one of the reasons a jury might find Johnson's delay in reporting Friis 's behavior reasonable. Indeed, 
many plaintiffs facing the Faragher affirmative defense claim that they delayed reporting or never 
rep01ied the harassment against them out of fear of retaliation by the harasser. And yet courts 
dealing with this issue have consistently held that as a matter of law fear of retaliation alone is 
unreasonable under the Faragher second prong. The Eleventh Circuit in Baldwin expressed this 
very succinctly: 
Baldwin (the plaintiff) waited too long to complain. Her complaint came three 
months and two weeks after the first proposition incident and three months and one 
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week after the second one. That is anything but prompt, early, or soon. Baldwin 
argues that her delay in reporting the harassment was reasonable because she had 
good reasons for not doing so sooner. An employee in extreme cases may have 
reasons for not reporting harassment earlier that are good enough to excuse the delay, 
but the ones that Baldwin puts forth are not. Baldwin says that she waited to file her 
complaint until November 8, 200 I-three months after the solicitation in Head's 
office at the very end of July-because she feared being fired and felt silence would 
best serve her career interests. Her goal, she testified, was to "just go along to get 
along." While we have recognized that filing a sexual harassment complaint may be 
"uncomfortable, scary, or both," we have also explained that "the problem of 
workplace discrimination ... cannot be corrected without the cooperation of the 
victims." The Faragher and Ellerth decisions present employees who are victims of 
harassment with a hard choice: assist the prevention of harassment by promptly 
reporting it to the employer, or lose the opportunity to successfully prosecute a Title 
VII claim based on harassment. Every employee could say, as Baldwin does, that she 
did not report the harassment earlier for fear oflosing her job or damaging her career 
prospects. As the First Circuit has explained, the Supreme Court undoubtedly 
realized as much when it designed the Faragher-Ellerth defense, but it nonetheless 
decided to require an employee to make the choice in favor of ending harassment if 
she wanted to impose vicarious liability on her employer. Were it otherwise, the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense would be largely optional with plaintiffs, and it would be 
essentially useless in furthering the important public policy of preventing sexual 
harassment. 
Id. Indeed, the court in Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 ( 4th Cir.2001) 
observed that "[b ]y advancing a speculative 'fear ofretaliation' excuse for remaining silent, Ban-ett's 
argument would undermine the primary objective of Title VII and could result in more, not less, 
sexual harassment going undetected." In other words, by not reporting the harassment, the plaintiff 
wholly undermines the protective measures of Title VII. 
Numerous other courts across the jurisdictions have found the same. See Adams v. 0 'Reilly 
Automotive, Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 932-33 (8 th Cir. 2008) (holding"[ w Je do not believe that a fear of 
retaliation is generally a proper excuse for failing to report sexual harassment" and "[t]o excuse a 
victim from the duty to alert the proper authorities through proper channels specifically discourages 
the best hope of exposing and eliminating sexual harassment [] [and] [n]ormally bringing a 
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retaliation claim, rather than failing to report sexual harassment, is the appropriate response to the 
possibility of retaliation"); Jernigan v. Alderwoods Group, Inc., 489 F.Supp.2d 1180 (D.Oregon 
2007) (holding"an employee's subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not 
alleviate the employee's duties under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile 
environment") citing Shav., v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7 th Cir. 1999); Beyer v. Baker 
School Dist., 2005 WL 351936 *8 (D.Oregon) ("a generalized fear of retaliation cannot justify a 
failure to report sexual harassment"); Speaks v. City of Lakeland, 315 F.Supp.2d 1217, 1228 
(M.D.Fla. 2004) (finding "subjective fears of reprisal may exist in every case, but those fears, 
standing alone, do not excuse an employee's failure to report a supervisor's harassment"); Verges 
v. Shelby County Sheriff's Office, 2010 WL 2696764 * 10 (W.D. Tenn.) (holding that a "generalized 
fear of retaliation unaccompanied by any objective evidence to substantiate that fear, however, is, 
as a matter oflaw, insufficient to justify an employee's failure to comply with a reporting policy"); 
E.E.O.C. v. Restaurant Co., 490 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1049 (D.Minn. 2007) (holding "an employee's 
subjective fears of retaliation do not alleviate the employee's duty to alert the employer to the 
harassment"); see also Lyle v. ESPN Zone, 292 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.Maryland 2003 ); Clark v. United 
Parcel Service, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 819 (W.D.Ky. 2003), overturned on other grounds; and Murray 
v. Chicago TransitAuth., 252 F.3d 880 (t" Cir. 2001) (holding "[a]lthough Murray claims she feared 
further harassment if she reported her actions, her subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness, 
or retaliation do not alleviate her duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile 
environment"). 
Victoria Johnson may well have subjectively feared that by reportingFriis's behavior to NIC 
her "I" grade may have been jeopardized or she may have faced other retaliation from Friis, but that 
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is not a reasonable excuse for waiting to report the harassment. Johnson has provided to this Comt 
no evidence that Friis ever communicated to her in any manner any threat or implication of 
retaliation in any circumstances. As NIC demonstrated on summary judgment, Johnson admitted 
at deposition that her fear her grade would be affected by her responses to Friis's advances was 
entirely her own subjective thought, and she acknowledged Friis neither said nor did anything to give 
credence to that fear. See Castleton Ajj., Exh. A (Johnson Deposition Vol. I, p. 116:7 - 117:2); Exh. 
K, n.2. Johnson has admitted that these fears ofretaliation she had were entirely subjective to her, 
and that Friis never indicated the same. 
There are some exceptional reasons observed by courts that excuse a plaintiffs delay or 
failure to report. These often include situations where the plaintiff has communicated harassment 
to the employer once but the employer failed to act, thus making the plaintiff credibly and objectively 
believe that a second report would be futile. Further, some courts have excused a plaintiffs failure 
to timely report harassment on the basis of a credible fear of retaliation.3 This credible fear "must 
be based on more than the employee's subjective belief," and must be shown by affirmative evidence 
proffered by the plaintiff. This proof must be "evidence that the employer has ignored or resisted 
similar complaints or has taken adverse actions against employees in response to such complaints." 
Cruz v. Liberatore, 582 F.Supp.2d 508, 526-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), citing Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 
3However, as explained in the 11 th Circuit's decision in Baldwin above, many comis will 
not excuse a delay or failure to report harassment even when there is a credible and substantiated 
fear of retaliation, as Title VII also provides a cause of action to an employee for retaliation 
against an employer who takes an adverse employment action against an employee for filing a 
claim of discrimination under Title VII. 
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239 F.3d 243, 245 (2nd Cir. 2001).4 Absent this credible threat of retaliation, there is no 
reasonableness in an employee's failure to report based on fear of retaliation (see Weger v. City of 
Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 725 (8 th Cir. 2007) (holding "where the alleged harassing supervisor never told 
employee that her job was in jeopardy, nor did he threaten her with physical harm, the employee did 
not reasonably avail herself of the protections afforded by her employer's antiharassment policies") 
quoting Walton v. Johnson, 347 F.3d 1272, 1291 (l Jlh Cir. 2003)). 
Other similar reasons proffered by plaintiffs for delay in reporting harassment have been 
rejected by courts as unreasonable as a matter of law, including a plaintiffs contention that she 
delayed reporting harassment until she could find a corroborating witness to support her claims 
(Adams v. 0 'Reilly Automotive, Inc., 538 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2008), and a plaintiffs contention that 
she did not report sexual harassment to her employer because the employer had not handled her 
unrelated disability discrimination claim to her satisfaction (Holly D. V Cal. Ins. a/Tech., 339 F.3d 
1158 (91h Cir. 2003)). Courts have also rejected an employee's subjective belief that his or herreport 
of harassment to the employer would be futile as a reasonable excuse for delay or failure to report 
harassment (Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262,268 (4th Cir. 2001); see also 
Mangrum v. Republic Ind., Inc., 260 F.Supp.2d 1229 (N.D. Ga. 2003)). Given these cases, it is clear 
that only in extraordinary cases will a court excuse a plaintiffs delay or failure to report sexual 
harassment. Johnson has provided no such extraordinary circumstances here, only claiming a 
subjective and unsubstantiated fear ofretaliation for her failure to report. 
4Note that in these cases the plaintiff is required to prove the employer-not the 
supervisor-would have retaliated against the employee for reporting harassment. Johnson's 
alleged fears of retaliation are focused solely on Friis. 
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B. The Time Johnson Waited to Report is Significant 
Johnson claims she was first harassed by Friis during the Fall 200 I semester. She admits she 
never reported his actions to any NIC official regarding that alleged harassment until January 2005 
when she told Judy Bundy. This constitutes a delay of over three years in reporting Friis' s conduct. 
Johnson also claims Friis harassed her during the time she was enrolled in his class in the 
Spring 2004 semester. She dropped out of school midway through the semester. Yet she again 
delayed any report to NIC of this harassment until January 2005, constituting a delay of between nine 
months and a year. 
And, Johnson alleges she was harassed by Friis during the summer of 2004, leading up to 
August 20, 2004, when she finally informed Friis his actions were not welcomed. Yet she waited 
until January 2005 to report this as well, a delay ofnearly five months. And what is important here 
is the fact that during these four months Johnson had no contact with Friis, and in fact had no contact 
with him ever again after that August 20 conversation. Yet still she delayed her report of Friis' s 
behavior until that following January. 
NIC' s antiharassment policy and procedure required Johnson to report any sexually harassing 
behavior within ninety (90) days of the occmTence. Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of 
NIC's MotionforSummaryJudgment, Exhibit],~ 12. HadJohnsoncomplied with this requirement 
in 2001, NIC could have prevented all ofFriis's conduct in 2004. Had Johnson complied with this 
requirement upon again experiencing Friis's harassment in the Spring 2004 class, NIC could have 
prevented Friis's conduct during that time period. Instead, Johnson waited until her interaction with 
Friis had come to an end before notifying NIC of the harassment. 
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This delay in notifying NIC of Friis's actions is material, as courts have found that the time 
period of delay in reporting affects the employer's ability to eradicate the harassment before it 
becomes severe or pervasive. See Baldwin, 480 F.3d at 1307 (finding that delay of three months and 
two weeks to report was unreasonably); Hardage v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 427 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 
2005) (holding employee's failure to report harassment for six months was unreasonable as a matter 
of law under Faragher); Holly D. V Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding plaintiffs failure to report unwelcome conduct until one year after the most recent activity 
and two years after the first incident was unreasonable as a matter oflaw); Scrivner v. Socorro Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969, 972 (5 th Cir. 1999) (holding eight month delay in reporting harassment was 
unreasonable); McCurdyv. Arkansas State Police, 375 F.3d 762, 773 (9th Cir. 2004) (observing "if 
[harasser] had engaged in his harassing conduct for months and McCurdy had not reported him, the 
ASP would not be liable for [his] harassment"); Pinkerton v. Colo. Dept. ofTransp., 563 F.3d 1052 
(10th Cir. 2009) (holding that a delay of two and a half months in reporting harassing behavior was 
unreasonable under Faragher/Ellerth); Williams v. Missouri Dept. of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972 
(8 th Cir. 2005) (holding a delay of four months in reporting was unreasonable); and Finnerty v. 
William H. Sadlier, Inc., 176 Fed.Appx. 158 (2nd Cir. 2006) (ruling three-year delay in reporting 
unreasonable). 
The length of Johnson's delay in rep01ting Friis to NIC is substantial and material to the 
question at hand. Johnson waited over three years to report the harassment that occurred in the Fall 
2001 semester, and she waited between five months to a year to report the harassment that occurred 
in 2004. Without question she failed to report any harassment within the 90-day window required 
by NIC. This delay is material evidence of the unreasonableness of Johnson's delay, pa1ticularly 
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where Johnson has not provided any evidence of a valid, substantiated reason why she waited so 
long. 
C. Johnson's Reason for Reporting Friis is Inconsistent with Faragher 
It is significant that Johnson did not report Friis's behavior until she mistakenly believed he 
had changed her "I" grade to an "F." This occurred during her meeting with Judy Bundy in January 
2005 when she was again preparing to re-start classes at NIC. It can be easily surmised from these 
facts that had Johnson not met with Bundy at that time, or had Bundy not looked at Johnson's grades 
during that meeting, that Johnson would likely have delayed her reporting of Friis' s conduct well 
beyond January 2005. This is easily inferred because this was the second time Johnson was trying 
to re-start her classes at NIC after having dropped out in the middle of a semester. Johnson dropped 
out during the Fall 2001 semester and re-started her classes in January 2004 after meeting with her 
advisor, Judy Beckendorf. At that time, Johnson decided to retake the computer class from Friis 
despite the harassment she claims she received from him in 2001. Johnson made no report ofFriis's 
behavior to NIC upon re-starting classes in 2004, though she claims his behavior caused her to drop 
out of school. Had she not seen the "F" grade in the computer class in January 2005, and mistakenly 
believed that Friis had taken negative action against her by the grade change, it is reasonable to 
believe Johnson would have continued with her education at NIC without notifying that school of 
Friis's past behavior. After all, Johnson had notified Friis that prior August of her rejection of his 
advances and Friis had complied with her request that he stop contacting her. 
Given the facts of this case, it is apparent that Johnson's decision to report Friis's behavior 
in January 2005 was not to prevent Friis from further harassing her. Rather, her reason for reporting 
Friis was because she was upset because she thought he changed her grade, and she wanted to be 
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compensated for his actions. In her written complaint of sexual harassment to NIC, Johnson stated 
that "the reason I decided to make a formal complaint is so that I can try and put all of this behind 
me." Castleton Aff., Exh. J, sub-exhibit A, p. NIC 534. In telling NIC what she wanted done as a 
result of her reporting Friis's behavior, she stated she would like her grade changed in Friis's 
computer class and to have her financial aid concerns addressed so she could finish her schooling 
at NIC without having to pay for her classes during the Spring 2004 semester. She then stated: "I 
would like to see the wrongs that were done made right, so I can go forward in a positive, 
empowered, and prideful way once again." Id at p. NIC 535. Johnson says nothing about wanting 
to report Friis's behavior in order to stop it or to prevent it from happening again, and it is clear that 
by the time Johnson reported Friis's conduct she did not believe she was ever going to interact with 
him again. She simply wanted to seek compensation. 
This is in stark contrast with the principles and purposes of Title VII and the 
Faragher/Ellerth structure of combating sexual harassment. 
Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and 
effective grievance mechanisms. Were employer liability to depend in part on an 
employer's effort to create such procedures, it would effect Congress's intention to 
promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context. To the extent 
limiting employer liability could encourage employees to report harassing conduct 
before it becomes severe or pervasive, it would also serve Title VII's detenent 
purposes. As we have observed, Title VII bonows from tort law the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, and the considerations which animate that doctrine would 
also support the limitation of employer liability in certain circumstances. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 ( emphasis added). As demonstrated above, the purpose of this system is to 
allow NIC to curb sexually harassing behavior before it rises to the level of discrimination. Johnson 
was not seeking to curb Friis's behavior in reporting him to NIC; rather, she was seeking recompense 
for his past actions. "[T]he reporting requirement [ of Faragher/Ellerth] serves the primary objective 
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of Title VII which is not lo provide redress but to avoid harm." Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy 
Corp., 240 F.Jd 262,267 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). 
As the Court is well aware, Johnson's sole remaining claim in this lawsuit is one for 
respondeat superior liability to NIC. This Court has found,ti.o factual dispute that NIC did not !mow 
about Friis's conduct until Johnson reported it in January 2005, and that NIC took prompt and 
appropriate action to address these claims once it learned of them. Johnson is seeking to make NIC 
vicariously liable for the conduct of one of its employers, of which conduct NIC was not aware, and 
as such Johnson must be able with overcome NIC' s Faragher affirmative defense. 5 This affirmative 
defense is specific to NIC and its actions throughout the course of the factual events of this case. 
Johnson can only prevail on a claim of vicarious liability against NIC if she proves that NIC did 
something wrong in the process, whether by failing to have a policy or procedure in place to address 
harassment (prong 1 ), or by doing something to Johnson to cause her to reasonably and objectively 
believe arepo1i of sexual harassment to NIC would not possibly lead to the discontinuance ofFriis's 
behavior (prong 2). 
Johnson failed to fulfill her duties under Title VII by promptly reporting Friis's harassing 
behavior before it could become severe or pervasive. Instead, she waited until after her interaction 
with him had ended and filed her report because she mistakenly thought he had changed her grade. 
Johnson never gave NIC its opportunity to fulfill its opportunity to curb Friis's behavior early on. 
Her report was filed to seek compensation for damages, not to stop harassing behavior. 
5NIC having already established that Johnson suffered no adverse educational action at 
the hands of Friis, thus making it eligible to attempt to assert the Faragher affirmative defense. 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
Johnson never gave NIC the opportunity to correct Friis's behavior towards her, and NIC did 
nothing that would ever objectively and reasonably cause Johnson to believe NIC would handle the 
situation with Friis any different than the way it actually did when she made her report in 2005. 
Johnson has failed to provide any factual allegation that, if believed by a jury at trial, would justify 
her delay in reporting Friis's behavior as a matter of law. Whether a jury believes Johnson's reasons 
for delaying her report to NIC are reasonable must be judged in light of the Faragher/Ellerth 
standard as established in the cases above. A subjective and unsubstantiated fear of retaliation is, 
as a matter of law, not a justification for delay. Most, if not all, persons reporting sexual harassment 
against a supervisor will experience a fear of retaliation. Such a feeling is inherent in the very act 
of reporting harassment. The Faragher and Ellerth courts knew this, and yet they still required 
victims of harassment to report to the employer in order to preserve a claim ofvicarious liability 
against the employer. Johnson had no objective and credible reason to believe she would experience 
retaliation if she did not accept Friis's advances. 6 
Johnson's desire to maintain her "I" grade in Friis's class is not, as a matter of law, 
justification for her delay in reporting Friis's conduct to NIC. Nothing in the litany of 
Faragher/Ellerth cases even suggests that a desire to retain the benefits that flow from a relationship 
based on sexual harassment excuses reporting the harassment. 
6In fact, Johnson never did give in to Friis's advances. The evidence is undisputed that he 
repeatedly asked her on dates and she repeatedly rejected those invitations. And Friis never took 
any negative action against her, but instead gave her preferential treatment when he allowed her 
the "I" grade. It is unclear how, given this clear pattern of behavior between them, Johnson 
could have reasonably been afraid that her failure to give in to his advances would result in 
retaliation. 
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Likewise, Johnson's belief that Friis's behavior may improve is not, as a matter of law, 
justification for her delay. 7 Again, nothing in the Faragher/Ellerth cases establish this as a 
reasonable purpose of delaying a report of harassment. Certainly by the start of the Spring 2004 
semester, when Johnson alleges Friis 's harassing behavior began again, she knew his behavior would 
not improve, and that hoping the same wasn't going to change that. McMillan Ajf., Exh. A, ,i 3. 
As the cases above make clear, the only real justification available to Johnson for delaying 
or failing to report sexual harassment to NIC would be if NIC did something either directly or 
indirectly that gave Johnson an objective, substantiated, and credible belief that her report of sexual 
harassment would not have been heeded by NIC. This never happened, and NIC demonstrated the 
exact opposite response when Johnson finally reported Friis in 2005. 
Accordingly, NIC has plainly shown that Johnson has failed to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether she unreasonably delayed her reporting of Friis' s harassing behavior. NIC 
fully fulfilled its responsibilities under the Faragher/Ellerth structure, while Johnson completely 
failed to fulfill hers, entirely preventing NIC from doing anything to stop Friis's behavior towards 
her when it was occurring. Having fully fulfilled its obligations to Johnson, and Johnson having 
failed to do the same, NIC should not have to stand trial on this issue. 
7Nor has Johnson ever argued that this was a reason she did not report Friis. Rather, she 
contends it was the reason she decided to take his class again in 2004 despite his alleged 
harassment towards her in 2001. See Plaintiffs Opposition to NI C's MSJ, Affidavit of James 
McMillan, Exh. A, ,i 2. 
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Dated this 26th day of October, 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
Corporation, and DONALD FRIIS, an 
individual 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-7150 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT NORTH IDAHO 
COLLEGE'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
tg]UUl 
CO:tvIES NOW the Plaintiff, VICTORIA JOHNSON, by and through her Counsel of 
Record JAMES McMILLAN, Attorney at Law, and hereby respectfully moves this Coun for its 
Order DENYING Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and submits her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration as follows: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The facts and procedural history in this matter have been set forth on numerous occasions 
in the parties' respective pleadings, briefs, and memoranda throughout the course of litigation on 
this matter. As such, Plaintiffs prior recitations of the facts and procedure of this case are hereby 
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expressly incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. 
On October 15, 2010, this Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Defendant's Motion for Swnmary Judgment. On or about October 26, 2010, Defendant filed its 
Motion for Reconsideration, which is now before the Court. In its Motion, Defendant narrows 
its argument to the Faragher affinnative defense, and the reasonableness of the timing of 
Plaintiff's report of Friis' offending behavior. Motion far Reconsideration at 4-16. Nevertheless, 
this Court should affirr.o its previous decision and DENY Defendant's Motion far 
Reconsideration for the reasons set forth below. 
II. ARGUMEN,T 
The primary focus of Defendant's argument is this Court's correct finding that a 
reasonable jury could conclude that any delay in bringing the form.al complaint of harassment 
was reasonable. Memorandum Decision and Order at 8. In doing so, Defendant cites and quotes 
from a number of cases in which various courts had held that a fear of retaliation was i11sufficient 
to justify a failure to report or delay in reporting. Motion for Reconsideration at 7-11. 
Defendant also claims that these cases stand for the proposition that a fear of retaliation is not 
reasonable as a "matter oflaw." Id. 
Initially, a review of the cases cited by Defendant shows that, in none of said cases, does 
the court therein make a definitive ruling that a fear of retaliation is insufficient as a matter of 
law; rather, the courts in those cases simply found that, based upon the record therein, the 
plaintiffs therein had failed to show that their fear of retaliation was sufficient in those particular 
cases in order to justify a failure to, or delay in, reporting the offending behavior. In this case, 
the record is clear as to Plaintiff's reasons, as summarized on Page 8 of this Court's Order. 
Additionally, Plaintiff's fears that her grade may be affected by her response to Friis' 
advances, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, 1~ 6 and 8 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 66); in 
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addition to similar fears on the part of other students, see Affidavit of Michelle Cook, 1 5 
(Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 67), and that fact that Plaintiff believed that she would be 
required to take Friis' class a pre-requisite to graduation, Affidavit of Victoria Johnson. ~ 7 
(Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 66) would allow a rational trier of fact to draw a reasonable 
conclusion that Plaintiffs delay in filing the formal complaint was entirely reasonable, as this 
Court correctly found following hearing on Summary Judgment. The cases cited by Defendant, 
while they are certainly examples of Courts finding to the contrary, do not establish a legal 
precedent that such fear is unreasonable as a matter oflaw. Once again, while Defendant NIC is 
perfectly free to argue its affumative defense at trial, the weight of evidence on the record, 
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-movant, does not create a lack of a genuine issue of 
material fact regarding sai.d defense. As such, Summary Judgment remains inappropriate 
regarding Defendants' affirmative defense and, therefore, Defendant's Motion should be 
DENIED 
Furthermore, on the remaining elements of the defense, there remains a genuine issue of 
material fact, such that a rational trier of could reasonably find, th~t Defendant NIC did not 
exercise reasonable care in "preventing and correcting promptly" Friis' sexually harassing 
behavior, According to Plaintiffs Affidavit, despite being placed on notice of Defendant Friis' 
behavior, Defendant NCC failed to take any action. Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ir 11 (Federal 
Proceeding, Docket No. 66). Moreover, NJC had been placed on notice regarding previous 
incidents involving other students, and, yet, failed to remove Friis from the classroom, provide 
additional supervision, or othenvise provide prevent the harn15smtmt at issue. ld. at fl 12-13 ; 
Affidavit of Rarni Amaro, Exhibits A and B (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 65); Affidavit of 
Michelle Cook, 1 6 (Federal Proceeding, Docket No. 67). Again, while Defendant is certainly 
free to argue this element of its affinnative defense at trial, the record, viewed in a light most 
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favorable to the non-moving party, does not warrant a grant of Summary Judgment upon said 
Defense, and this Court's prior decision should be af:finned. 
On the next element, it also remains that there is a genuine issue of material fact, such 
that a rational trier of could reasonably find, that the plaintiff did not unreasonably fail to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid 
hann otheiwise." Initially, in addition to the actual notice regarding the harassment of the other 
students, Plaintiff did note her discom.fon regarding Friis' behavior to NIC staff members} prior 
to filing the formal complaint. Affidavit of Victoria Johnson, ~I 11. 
III. CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant NIC's Motion for Reonsideration 
should be DENIED. 
DATED this 10th day of December, 2010. 
JAMES McMILLAN 
&iomeyfor Plaintiff. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST .nTDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho corporation, 
and DONALD FR.lIS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7150 
DEFENDANT NORTH IDAHO 
COLLEGE'S REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT NIC'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Defendant North Idaho College ("NIC"), by and through its counsel of record, Naylor & 
Hales, P.C., hereby files Reply Memorandum for its Motion for Reconsideration. For the reasons 
stated below, this Court should disregard the objections raised by Plaintiff in her Objection and grant 
Defendru.1t NIC's Motion. 
I. Plaintiff's Argument as to the Faragher-Ellerth Rule is Without Merit 
In her Objection to Defendant NIC' s Motion for Reconsideration Plaintiff asks this Court to 
review the numerous cases cited by NIC in its Motion for Reconsideration and find that none of 
DEFENDANT NIC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM -1, 
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those cases stand for the proposition that a generalized fear of retaliation is insufficient as a matter 
of law to justify a delay in reporting sexual harassment under the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative 
defense. Without citing to a single case or other authority to support her Objection, Plaintiff asks 
this Court to disregard numerous pertinent cases issued by federal courts that are squarely on point 
with the issue at question for no reason other than immaterial and unspecified factual differences 
between those cases and the present proceeding, This rationale would serve to do no less than to 
ignore the plain language of those decisions and subvert the very jurisprudential process. 
The cases cited by NIC in its Motion for Reconsideration set forth a clear standard of law 
applicable to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense. This standard is: absent extreme 
circumstances creating a substantiated and specific threat of retaliation, a generalized fear of 
retaliation for reporting sexual harassment does not constitute a valid basis for not reporting that 
sexual harassment, and a failure by the employee to report harassment on that basis is unreasonable 
and thus enables an employer to meet the second prong of the Faragher~Ellerth affirmative defense. 
What Plaintiff will not acknowledge is that those numerous cases cited by NIC in its Motion for 
Reconsideration do establish that very rule as a matter oflaw. That is the very plain and unequivocal 
holdings of those rulings. 
A. Cases Do State This Rule SpeciflcallJ: 
Plaintiff argues in her Objection: "Initially, a review of the cases cited by Defendant shows 
that, in none of said cases, does the court therein make a definitive ruling that a fear of retaliation 
is insuffieient as a matter of law .... " Objection, p. 2 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff apparently 
failed to read the cases cited. In the Eighth Circuit case of Adams v. 0 'Reilly Automotive, Inc., S3 8 
F.3d 926, 932-33 (2008) (cited on p. 8 ofNIC's Motion for Reconsideration), the court held that 
DEFENDANT NIC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM - 2, 
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" [ w] e do not believe that a fear of retaliation is generally a proper excuse for failing to report sexual 
harassment." The Court then found that the employer, O'Reilly, "has demonstrated the 
unreasonableness of Ms. Adam's failure to report Mr. Schroeder's harassment sooner, and that 
O'Reilly has thus established the second element of the Ellerth-F aragher defense.'' The court then 
concluded: "Having successfully established both elements of the Ellerth-Faragher defense as a 
matter oj law, we hold that O'Reilly was entitled to summary judgment" (emphasis added), The 
Eight Circuit held plainly in that case that a generalized fear of retaliation is unreasonable as a matter 
of law. 
In Verges v. Shelby County Sheriff's Office, 2010 WL 2696764 (W.D. Tenn,) (cited on p. 9 
of NIC 's brief) the rule was more succinctly stated, wherein the court plainly held that a "generalized 
fear of retaliation, unaccompanied by an objective evidence to substantiate that fear, however, is, as 
a matter of law; insufficient to justify an employee's failure to comply with a reporting policy" 
(emphasis added). I:r!Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243,246 (2nd Cir. 2001) (cited onpp, 10-
11 of NIC's Motion) that court found that where in claiming fear of retaliation the employee "did 
not come forward with any such [credible evidence of retaliation], but instead simply asserted her 
apprehension that she would be fired for speaking up ... [s]uch conclusory assertions fail as a matter 
of law to constitute sufficient evidence to establish that her fear was credible .... " And in Weger v. 
City oJ Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 726 (8lh Cir. 2007) (cited onp. 10 of NIC's brief), that court held that 
where plaintiff's only excuse for failing to timely report sexual harassment was a general fear of 
retaliation, "[w]e, therefore, find plaintiff's unreasonably delayed reporting Baldwin's harassment, 
satisfying the second element of the affinnative defense as a matter oj law." The language in these 
cases is abundantly transparent. 
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The other cases cited by NIC carry the same holding regardless of whether their langl.1age is 
as specific as those cited above. The rules enunciated by those courts are clearly consistent and 
unifonn with those cases above that contain the phrase to the effect that the delay is unreasonable 
"as a matter of law." Plaintiff's quibbling over this issue is both faulty and without justification. 
More so, contrary to the Plaintiff's assertions, the cases cited by N1C are not factually 
distinguishable in any material sense from the present proceeding, as the plaintiffs in those cases did 
the very same thing now done by Ms. Johnson: they attempted to excuse their failure to timely report 
sexual harassment on ·a speculative and generalized fear of retaliation. And in each one of those 
cases, the courts fou11d that as a matter of law such an excuse was without merit. The courts in 
Baldwin, Barrett, and the other cases cited by NIC in its Motion, would have ruled no differently had 
they reviewed J obnson' s factual circumstmces instead. To argue that those cases would have been 
decided differently merely because of immaterial factual differences ignores the basic purpose of 
stare decisis, This Court is not required to formulate a new rule out of whole cloth with each case 
simply because it is dealing with different parties or minor factual variations when other courts have 
not only created a rule already, but have 1.mifonnly abided by that rule in its application. 
B. Those Cases Cited by NIC Demonstrate the Rationale of the Rule 
In its Motion for Reconsideration NlC cites to 11wnerous cases that 11ot only establish this rule 
as a matter of law, but which further explain why this is the law, going back to the very policy 
reasons behind Title VII and the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Faragher and Ellerth. The 
Baldwin case from the Eleventh Circuit (480 F.3d 1287), in particular, sets forth the very rationale 
why a generalized fear of retaliation cannot justify a failure to report harassment wider Title VII 
(finding that the Faragher-Ellerth "plan is that the corresponding duties it places on the employers 
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and employees are designed to stop sexual harassment before it reaches the severe or pervasive stage 
amounting to discrimination," and therefore the U.S. Supreme Court "decided to require an 
employee to make the choice in favor of ending harassment [ despite fear of retaliation] if she wanted 
to impose vicarious liability on her employer'') (1306-07). The Fourth Circuit found in Barrett v. 
Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (2001) that "[b]y advancing a speculative 'fear 
of retaliation' excuse for remaining silent, Barrett's argument would undermine the primary 
objective of Title VII and could result in more, not less, sexual harassment going undetected." See 
NIC's Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 7-11, 14-16. 
These courts would not have invoked the underlying purpose and rationale of Title VII in 
their decisions had they merely meant to apply the rules they formulated to a single, isolated case. 
Rather, those courts went to the effort of expoimding and explaining the rules they formulated so that 
other courts would have the understanding of the rule sufficient to apply it to other relevant cases. 
C. The Courts Cited Were Undertaking Statutory Interpretation 
Perhaps the most important issue to be noted in correcting Plaintiffs assertions about the 
numerous cases finding this sta11dard oflaw emmciated above is the fact that the cases cited by NIC 
with regards to the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense constitute those courts' judicial 
interpretation of Title Vil. As this Court knows well, the Faragher-Eller th affinnative defense is 
a judicially-carved test to determine whether an employer may be exempt from vicarious liability for 
a supervisor's sexual harassment of a subordinate w1der Title VII. Thus, these courts' decisions in 
establishii1g that a generalized fear of retaliation is, as a matter of law, an unreasonable excuse for 
failing to timely report the harassment, are intelJ)retations of Title Vil as well. The Idaho Code sets 
forth: "All questions of law arising upon the trial, including ... the construction of statutes and other 
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writings ... are to be decided by the court when submitted and before the trial proceeds ... ," I. C. § 9-
102. Thus, this Court also has the power and responsibility of interpreting Title VII here, particularly 
where no other Idaho court has done the same as to this issue.1 This is a question of law for the 
Court, not a question of fact for the jury. 
Defendant NIC is asking this Court to: (1) interpret the IHRA and rule consistent with the 
numerous federal jurisdictions cited in its Motion to find that, as a matter of law, a generalized fear 
of retaliation does not excuse an employee from reporting sexual harassment under the Title VIl 
framework and the Faragher-Ellerth doctrine; and (2) accordingly find that under this rule, 
Johnson's claim of vicarious liability against NIC fails as a matter of law because she unreasonably 
delayed reporting Friis' s harassment, and her excuse forth at delay of a non-specific, generalized fear 
of retaliation is unreasonable as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c) holds that this Court should render summary judgment if, upon viewing the 
evidence before it, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as amatteroflaw." NIC does not dispute Plaintiff's assertion that her reasons 
1 As already cited by NIC, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently stated that Idaho 
Code§ 67-5901 (the statement of purpose of the Idaho Human Rights Act) "allows our state 
courts to look to federal law for guidance when interpreting the Idaho Human Rights Act." Stout 
v. Key Training Corp., 144 Idaho 195, 197 (2007). In Stansbury v. Blue Cross of Idaho Health 
Svc., Inc., 128 Idaho 682, 685 (1996) the Idaho Supreme Court held: "When this Court has not 
had occasion, as here, to detennine the standards applicable to the adjudication of state claims 
patterned on a federal law, this Court may look to that body of federal law for guidance." In that 
case that Idaho court relied upon Ninth Circuit law applicable to the ADA in interpreting the 
IHRA, finding that where a plaintiff alleges intentional disability discrimination under the ADA, 
and the employer disavows any reliance upon the disability in making the employment decision, 
the analytical framework of Title VII cases should be employed. Id. This, as in this case, is a 
judicially-created rule, which rule was derived from the ADA by the Ninth Circuit in treating 
certain instances of alleged employer disability discrimination. Here, NIC is calling upon this 
Court to make the same type of interpretation of the !HR.A based on the multitude off ederal legal 
precedent cited in its brief, including cases from the Ninth Circuit. 
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for failing to report Friis' s alleged harassment are clear (Objection., p. 2). Thus, there is no question 
of fact as to why Ms. Johnson claims she failed to report the harassment. The only question 
remaining as to Faragher, then, is whether those proffered reasons constitute a justifiable delay in 
reporting harassment as a matter oflaw. 
Plaintiff urges this Court to find that this remaining issue is a question of fact. If the questio11 
of the reaso11ableness of Johnson's delay was one that could be decided with no other factors or 
standards attendant, then Plaintiff could be right. However, the courts ittterpreting Title VII have 
found that there are certain situations that, when factually uncontested, dictate a finding for the 
employer as a matter of law. Ms. Johnson's case falls squarely within that circwnstance, as the 
courts cited have unifomtly held that, under the Faragher defense when an employee fails to timely 
report sexual harassment only because she had a generalized fear of retaliation, this failure is 
wl!"easonable as a matter of law, precluding that issue's consideration by a jury. Thus, NIC' s Motion 
for Reconsideration should be granted and it should be granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs 
remaining claim. 
II. Plain.tiff h lncorJ;,ect in, A,Jserting The.re a.-e Ani More Unresolved Claims 
Plaintiff asserts in her Objection that there remains a genuine issue of material fact ~ to the 
first pro11g of the Faragher-Ellerrh affinnative defense, asserting that a trier of fact could find that 
NIC did not e>1:ercise reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct Friis's behavior. Objection, 
p. 3. This Coun's Memorandum Decision and Order says otherwise. This Court has ruled: "The 
teC(lrd before this Court is clear that NIC took reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct such 
an alleged discriminatory situation .... " Memorandum Decision and Order re: Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 8. The first prong has been satisfied by NIC, and the only question 
DEFENDANT NIC1S REPLY MEMORANDUM - 7. 
SC 38605-2011 313 of 323 
DEC. 15. 2 0 1 0 11 : 4 2 AM & HALES, PC NO. 753 P. 9 
remaining before this Court is whether Johnson's delay in reporting the harassment is unreaso11able 
as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in Defendant NIC' s Motion for Reco11sideration, the Motion 
should be granted and Plaintiffs sole remaining claim against NIC shol.lld be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
Dated this 15th day of December, 2010. 
ruc;e J. Castleton, Of the Firm 
Atto~eys for Defendant North. Idaho College 
DEFENDANT NIC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM - 8. 
SC 38605-2011 314 of 323 
D EC. 1 5. 2 0 1 0 11 : 4 2 AM N & HALES, PC NO. 753 P. 10 
CERTIFICATE OJLSERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day ofDecember, 2010, I caused to be served, by the 
method(s) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
James McMillan 
Attorney at Law 
415 Seventh Street, Ste, 7 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Peter C. Erbland 
Paine Hamblen, LLP 
701 Front Ave., Ste. 101 
P.O. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-2530 
Attorneys/or Def Friis 
M:\ICRMP\Johnson v. NIC\Plondinss\7223_ 48 Mtn Reconsideration Reply Brief(State).wpd 
DEFENDANT NIC'S REPLY MEMORANDUM. 9. 
SC 38605-2011 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Federal Express 
Fax Transmission 
(208) 752-1900 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Federal Express 
Fax. Transmission 
(208) 664-6338 
315 of 323 
Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-95 l l 
Facsimile No. (208) 3 83-95 l 6 
Attorneys for Defendant North Idaho College 
STA1t Or IDMO } S~ 
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI '"' 
F\LED: 
za 11 JAN 21 PM 2: l 3 
~. DIST~~RT 
. rut11 -
'v 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho corporation, 
and DONALD FRJIS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7150 
ORDER 
For the reasons set forth in this Court's oral decision announced in open court on 
January 1 l, 201 l at l :30 p.m. Pacific Time, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant North Idaho 
College's Motion for Reconsideration; VACATES AND RESCINDS the Court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order re: Defendant North Idaho College's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
October 15, 2010; and GRANTS North Idaho College's Motion for Summary Judgment in its 
entirety. 
ORDER-1. 
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Plaintiff Johnson's remaining claims as against Defendant North Idaho College are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho corporation, 
and DONALD FRIIS, an individual, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV06-7150 
JUDGMENT 
This case having been resolved through this Court's grant of summary judgment to 
Defendant North Idaho College, and all other claims having been previously adjudicated, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims are dismissed with prejudice, and 
this case is now deemed closed. 
DATED this~ day of :T C...½u.Q-A'.::\! 
I 
, 2011. 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT- I. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENiV 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, Case No. CV-06-7150 
Plaintiff, 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
VS, 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho 
Corporation, and DONALD FRIIS, an 
individual 
Fee Category: L.4 
Fee: $101 
Defendants. 
TO: CLERK OF THE SUPREME COl.JRT OF THE STATE OF ID.AHO AND TO 
THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 
THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
AND TO: Defendant North Idaho College and its attorneys, Kirtlan G. Naylor and 
Brnce J. Castleton, Naylor & Hales, P.C., 950 W. Bannock, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Defendant Donald Friis and his attorney, Peter C. Erbland 
Paine Hamblen, L.L.P., 701 Front Ave., P.O. Box E, 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
D ORIGINAL 320 of 323 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, VICTORIA JOHNSON, appeals against each and 
every one of the above-named Respondents, NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, et al., to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the Order and final judgment granting Summary Judgement to Defendants, 
entered in the above-entitled action on the 21 st day of January, 2011, by the Honorable Judge 
Haynes, presiding; 
2. The Appellant has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court Court, and the 
Decision described in Paragraph 1 above is appeal able under and pursuant to I.A.R. 11 ( a)(l ); 
3. This appeal is taken upon matters of both law and fact. The preliminary statement 
of issues on appeal is as follows: 
a. Did the District Court err in granting Summary Judgment to Defendants 
on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact, thus 
entitling them to a judgment as a matter of law with regard to their 
affirmative defenses raised to Plaintiffs claims? 
b. Did the District Court err in granting Defendant North Idaho College's 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the Record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is requested for the following hearings: 
a. Motion for Summary Judgment, September 8, 2010; 
b. Status Conference, November 1, 201 O; 
c. Motion for Reconsideration, December 17, 2010; and 
d. Decision, January 11, 2011. 
Said transcripts may be condensed. 
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6. The Plaintiff/ Appellant further requests that the following documents be included 
in the Clerk's record in addition to any automatically included pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
1) The record on remand from the United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho; 
2) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and all supporting 
Affidavits and Memoranda; 
3) Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and all supporting Affidavits and Memoranda; 
4) Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and all supporting 
Affidavits and Memoranda Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration and all supporting Affidavits and Memoranda; 
5) Any and all documents listed under Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b) 
(1 ). 
7. I certify: 
a. That one original and two copies have been filed with the District Court; 
b. That a copy has been served upon the Court's court reporter; 
c. That payment has been made to the Clerk of the Court for the estimated 
fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript 
d. That the Appellants' filing fee has been paid; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served by Rule 
20. 
J. 
DATED this _l_ day of March, 2011. 
JAMES McMILLA.."N, 
.NQT1CE OE ~~PBAL--3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
i. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the <"' day of March, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing to the fo~ng, by the method indicated below: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor/Bruce J. Castleton 
Naylor & Hales, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock, Ste. 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Defendant NIC 
Peter C. Erbland 
Paine Hamblen, L.L.P. 
701 Front Ave. 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Attorney for Defendant Friis 
Laurie Johnson 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 9000 
324 W. Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
Val Nunemacher 
Official Court Reporter 
P.O. Box 9000 
324 W. Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000 
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US.Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile to: (208) 383-9516 
U.S. Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
_x_ Facsimile to: (208) 664-6338 
_½_U.S.Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile to: 
_}_(_U.S.Mail 
Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile to: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Plaintiff ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Jdaho ) 
corporation, and DONALD FRJJS, an ) 
individual, ) 
) 
Respondents/Defendants ) 
Attorney for Appellant 
James McMillan 
417 Seventh St, Ste 7 
Wallace, ID 83873 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
38605-201 t 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Bruce J. Castleton 
950 W Bannock St., Ste 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter C. Erbland 
PO Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I.h~ve hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Kootenai, Idaho this day of · , 2011. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VICTORIA JOHNSON, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Plaintiff ) 
) 
vs ) 
) 
NORTH IDAHO COLLEGE, an Idaho ) 
corporation, and DONALD FRIIS, an ) 
individual, ) 
) 
Respondents/Defendants ) 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
38605-2011 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in 
and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United States 
mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Attorney for Appellant 
James McMillan 
417 Seventh St, Ste 7 
Wallace, ID 83873 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Bruce J. Castleton 
950 W Bannock St., Ste 610 
Boise, ID 83702 
Peter C. Erbland 
PO Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
IN WITNESS Wf-!EREOF, I l}aye hereun,to set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
Kootenai, Idaho this · day of 1 · r , 2011. 
,-r-~ 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
